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How to make a submission 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) welcomes 
submissions on the preliminary views expressed in this paper as well as any other 
relevant information that could assist and inform its advice to the Minister. 
Responses to this paper should be supported with evidence and data wherever 
possible. 
When making a submission, please title your document ‘Public submission to water 
market rules position paper by [INSERT NAME] on [INSERT DATE]’. 
If there is any information you would like to request the ACCC not make publicly 
available, you should provide it in a separate document that has ‘Confidential’ 
clearly marked on every page. 
The document containing confidential information should have a title such as 
‘Confidential annexure to submission by [INSERT NAME] on [INSERT DATE]’. 
(Information on the treatment of confidentiality is discussed in section 1.2.) 
Provision of electronic submissions by email is preferred. The ACCC encourages 
interested parties to make submissions either in Microsoft Word or in PDF (OCR-
readable text format—that is, they should be direct conversions from the word 
processing program, rather than scanned copies in which the text cannot be 
searched). 
Submissions should be sent to:  
Email:  water@accc.gov.au (submissions should use the word ‘Submission’ 
in the title of the email) 
Or by mail to the following address:  
Water Branch 
Water market rules—preliminary position paper 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission  
GPO Box 520  
Melbourne  Vic  3001  
General inquiries may be directed to the ACCC Infocentre on 1300 302 502 or to 
water@accc.gov.au. 
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Glossary 
This glossary endeavours to provide practical meanings of terms; however, readers may 
need to consider the legal meaning of some terms under the Water Act 2007 (Cwlth) 
and obtain legal advice on these definitions, if required. 
Externality  An externality is the effect of a purchase or use decision by 
one party that imposes costs or benefits on another party that 
are not reflected in the market price. 
Exit fee  A fee levied by an irrigation infrastructure operator on the 
transfer of a water entitlement out of the operator’s network 
or irrigation district (excluding any fee associated with the 
costs of processing that transfer). 
Conveyance loss Water lost through evaporation and seepage etc., related to 
distributing water through an operator’s network. These 
losses represent the difference between the volume of water 
which needs to be diverted, by an operator (from the water 
source) for distribution to customers and the volume of water 
actually delivered by the operator to customers. 
Irrigator A person who receives water delivery services from an 
irrigation infrastructure operator. This may include a person 
who receives water for any purpose, such as for stock and 
domestic use. 
Irrigation right A right that a person has against an irrigation infrastructure 
operator to receive water, that is, not a water access right or a 
water delivery right. 
Irrigation infrastructure 
operator (operator) 
Any person or entity who owns or operates infrastructure for 
the purpose of delivering irrigation water to another person 
(e.g. an irrigator). 
Irrigation district  An area or district that is supplied with water via an 
infrastructure supply network (channels, pipes and other 
structures) operated and maintained primarily to supply water 
for use within that district. 
Regulated water charge Charge to which the water charge rules (Division 1 of Part 4 
of the Water Act) apply. This includes fees and charges 
payable to an irrigation infrastructure operator for access to, 
or terminating access to, the operator’s network. 
 ix 
Termination fee A fee levied by an infrastructure operator when a delivery 
entitlement is surrendered to the infrastructure operator to 
terminate any rights or obligations associated with that 
delivery entitlement (including any requirement to pay an 
access fee). 
Transformation 
arrangement 
Process by which an irrigator permanently transforms their 
entitlement to water under an irrigation right against an 
irrigation infrastructure operator into a water access 
entitlement held by the irrigator (or anybody else), thereby 
reducing the share component of the operator’s water access 
entitlement. 
Water right  Any right to hold or take water from a water resource, akin to 
a property right over water. This may be a statutory right or a 
right against an irrigation infrastructure operator’s water 
access entitlement. 
Water access 
entitlement 
Open-ended or perpetual access to a share of the water 
resource that is available for consumption as specified in a 
water plan. 
Water allocation The specific volume of water allocated to a water access 
entitlement in a given season, defined according to rules 
established in the relevant water plan. 
Water delivery right A right to have water delivered by an infrastructure operator. 
 x 
Summary 
Water market rules  
The Water Act 2007 (the Act) creates new institutional and governance arrangements to 
address the sustainability and management of water resources in the Murray-Darling 
Basin (MDB). The Act builds on earlier reform initiatives, including the National 
Water Initiative (NWI) and the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement (MDBA), and is 
supplemented by federal government funding commitments of around $10 billion.1 
Key elements of this reform include: 
 Capping water diversions, addressing over-allocation and the needs of the 
environment through the federal government’s water buyback scheme which aims 
to achieve sustainable use of water in the MDB. 
 Modernisation of irrigation infrastructure to reduce water losses. 
 Removal of barriers to water trade to facilitate the operation of efficient water 
markets and provide opportunities for water trading. Water trading will allow water 
to be traded to its highest value use.  
The water market rules address the last of these points—barriers to water trade. The 
Water Bill 2007 explanatory memorandum states that the purpose of the water market 
rules is to: 
free up the trade of water access rights within the Murray-Darling Basin by ensuring that 
the policies or administrative requirements of [irrigation] infrastructure operators do not 
represent a barrier to trade.2 
The Act gives the Minister for Climate Change and Water the role of making water 
market rules. The ACCC’s role is to advise the minister on those rules and the role of 
monitoring compliance with, and enforcing, the rules. 
The ACCC’s advice to the minister will comprise proposed rules along with a 
statement of reasons for the approach adopted. This paper sets out the ACCC’s 
preliminary positions on the content of the water market rules. 
                                                 
1  The Intergovernmental Agreement on the National Water Initiative between the Australian 
Government and the governments of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory (as amended from 
time to time). The NWI (2004) built on the ‘Water Reform Framework’ agreed by the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in 1994, which was incorporated within the National Competition 
Policy Agreement in 1995. 
2  Explanatory memorandum to the Water Bill 2007, clause 97, paragraph 190, p. 28. 
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ACCC consultation 
In April 2008 the ACCC released an issues paper on the water market rules that sought 
information and submissions from interested parties. The ACCC has so far received 
61 submissions, all of which can be viewed on its website. 
This paper continues the consultation process. The ACCC is seeking submissions on 
the preliminary positions presented in the paper as well as any other relevant 
information that could assist with, and better inform, its advice to the minister. 
Given the timeframe for the ACCC to develop its advice on water market rules, 
submissions need to be provided no later than Friday, 15 August 2008. Submissions 
will be published on the ACCC website and provided to the minister, unless there are 
confidentiality issues. 
There will be further opportunities to inform the development of water market rules in 
October 2008, when the ACCC will: 
 release a draft decision that will incorporate draft rules and a supporting statement 
of reasons 
 hold public forums with interested stakeholders to discuss the ACCC’s draft advice.  
Final advice on water market rules will be provided to the minister in December 2008. 
Transformation and/or trade of water rights 
In many cases, statutory water access entitlements are held by irrigators. In these 
circumstances the irrigators have clearly defined water rights that can be traded. 
However, in New South Wales and South Australia water entitlements are typically 
held by irrigation infrastructure operators (‘operators’) on behalf of member irrigators.3  
Transformation allows an irrigator to permanently transform an entitlement held on 
their behalf by an operator into an independently held water access entitlement 
registered on a state water registry. An individual may prefer this arrangement because 
they consider it to be of greater value than an entitlement to water under an irrigation 
right. Once the water access entitlement is independently held, an irrigator can also 
trade the entitlement if they choose to do so.4  
In the absence of a legal requirement to act otherwise, an operator, as the owner of the 
group water access entitlement, can unilaterally prevent or delay any member from 
transforming their share of the group entitlement into a separate, independently held 
water access entitlement. 
                                                 
3  An irrigation infrastructure operator is any person who owns or operates infrastructure for the 
purpose of delivering irrigation water to another person (i.e. an irrigator or other water user). Where 
a group water access entitlement is held by an operator, the irrigation right held by a member is 
defined in their supply agreement with the operator. 
4  Held by someone other than the operator. 
 xii  
Submissions from irrigators point to a number of areas where inaction by operators 
impedes transformation and/or trade. Some irrigators have suggested that their 
operator’s transformation and/or trading processes are either poorly documented or not 
documented at all. In other cases, irrigators have expressed concern about onerous 
terms and conditions of transformation and/or trade approval, the processes for 
changing these terms, and the conditions and timeframes within which an operator must 
respond to any applications.  
This position paper proposes rules to improve transformation and/or trading processes 
and outcomes. The rules would: 
 require operators to do all things necessary to facilitate transformation and/or trade 
and prevent operators from unduly preventing or delaying these arrangements 
 require operators to establish clear terms and conditions for transformation and/or 
trade, and make these readily available to irrigators 
 establish consultation processes for changing the terms and conditions of 
transformation and/or trade 
 establish processes for assessing transformation and/or trade requests, including 
timeframes for responding to requests 
 link operator administrative fees and charges for processing a transformation and/or 
trade application to costs incurred by the operator.  
These requirements may prove onerous for small operators, at least initially. The 
ACCC proposes to establish standard forms for transformation and/or trade to assist 
such operators. Operators will then have the option of adopting the ACCC forms or 
developing their own. 
The ACCC’s preliminary positions on enabling transformation and/or trade of water 
rights are listed in box 1. 
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Box 1: ACCC preliminary positions—enabling transformation and/or trade 
of water rights 
Enabling transformation and/or trade 
1. An operator must do all things necessary to facilitate transformation and/or trade of 
all or part of an irrigator’s entitlement in accordance with the water market rules. 
2. An operator must not prevent or unreasonably delay transformation of all or part of 
an irrigator’s entitlement under any circumstances, other than in accordance with 
the water market rules. 
Terms and conditions 
3. Operators should have in place clearly stated terms and conditions to facilitate 
transformation and/or trade.  
4. The terms and conditions relating to transformation and/or trade approvals should: 
 be readily available to all parties and rationalised where possible 
 be published on the operator’s website (if applicable) and customers of 
the operator should be notified in writing of the existence of these 
documents. 
5. Operators should clearly define and document the process associated with making 
any required changes to the terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade 
approvals (the ACCC may also provide guidance to operators on the 
appropriateness of the process undertaken to implement such changes). 
6. Operators must consult with irrigators who may be materially affected by a change 
to the terms and conditions (the ACCC may also provide guidance to operators on 
what could be considered ‘material’). 
7. Operators must notify irrigators of all changes to their terms and conditions. 
8. In consulting with or notifying irrigators, operators should outline the reasons for 
the proposed change and supply supporting documentation if applicable. 
9. At the completion of the transitory adjustment period of the water market rules 
(date TBC), an operator must notify all its irrigators in writing of the application of 
the water market rules; specifically, an information pack should be provided to 
irrigators that includes a copy of the water market rules and applicable 
transformation application forms. 
Application process 
10. Operators must develop a base set of forms for both transformation applications and 
transformation and trade applications. The basic information required for both 
processes may include: 
 applicant details 
 account number 
 confirmation of identity 
 the number and type of units/volume to be transformed and/or traded 
 confirmation that all fees have been paid. 
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11. In addition, additional information for transformation and trade may include: 
 buyer details, including details of any existing water access entitlement for the 
transformed units to be appended to 
 the number and type of units/volume of water to be traded. 
12. An operator must not request details relating to the purpose for transformation and/or 
trade from applicants. 
13. An operator must make information regarding the applicant’s irrigation right readily 
available upon request and within a reasonable time frame. 
Time limits 
14. Operators must process applications efficiently, and not unduly delay the approval 
process. 
15. Time limits for processing transformation and/or trade applications are as follows: 
 initial assessment period—upon lodgment of an application, the operator 
must ensure that the application has been properly completed and request 
further details as required within three business days. 
 approval period—upon acceptance of a correctly completed application, the 
operator must process the application within 10 business days, including 
completion of the following steps:  
 processing and checking of the application 
 final approval by the operator 
 advising the applicant of the status of the application 
 referral of the application to the relevant jurisdictional authority for 
further approval (where applicable). 
 updating the register—once the operator has been advised of the final 
approval, it must ensure that the relevant register has been updated within 
two business days. 
16. These time limits do not include any time taken by the relevant jurisdictional authority 
in approving the transformation and/or trade. 
17. These time limits apply irrespective of an operator’s approval procedure or the size of 
the operator. 
Administrative fees and charges 
18. Any administrative fees and charges for processing a transformation and/or trade must 
be based on cost recovery. 
19. Any administrative fees for processing a transformation and/or trade must be contained 
within an operator’s terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade. 
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Water delivery rights 
The primary reason for transforming irrigation rights is to enable trade. However, there 
are a number of other benefits, including more clearly defined water rights, improved 
access to finance and streamlined trade in the future. These benefits may encourage 
irrigators to transform their irrigation rights without necessarily trading these out of 
their district. 
Before transformation, irrigators’ water rights are bundled in a package that comprises 
the right to a volume/share of water and the right to have this water delivered both 
encapsulated in their supply agreements with the operator. Once the right to water is 
unbundled into a separate water access entitlement through transformation, terms and 
conditions need to be established for water delivery. These terms and conditions may 
be substantially the same as those in the bundled package. In some cases, however, 
irrigation operators and irrigators may wish to re-negotiate terms and conditions of 
delivery. 
This position paper proposes measures to protect irrigators in such negotiations. One of 
the measures proposed is a requirement for the operator to continue to provide water 
delivery rights after transformation if required by the irrigator. A second measure is a 
requirement that the terms and conditions of the negotiated delivery contract should be 
substantially equivalent to those under the previous supply contract governing the 
irrigation right.  
The ACCC’s preliminary positions on water delivery rights are set out in box 2.  
 
Box 2:  ACCC preliminary positions—water delivery rights 
1. An operator must provide delivery arrangements for a transformed water entitlement 
if required by an irrigator.  
2. Upon transformation, terms and conditions of a delivery contract may reflect those 
contained in the arrangements as they previously related to the irrigation right.  
Alternatively, if a delivery contract is re-negotiated this must be done so in good faith 
between an operator and the irrigator with a transformed water entitlement. 
3. Unless otherwise negotiated, the terms and conditions of new delivery contracts 
should be substantially equivalent to those terms and conditions attached to delivery 
services provided under the previous supply contract governing the irrigation right. 
4. In circumstances where an operator’s standard delivery contract is not available or 
negotiation of a new delivery contract is required, the operator must use their best 
endeavours to negotiate a new contract within 30 days of the transformation being 
completed. 
5. During the time of negotiation, the operator must provide delivery services in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of delivery services under the previous 
supply contract governing the irrigation right. 
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Restrictions on transformation and trade 
As well as the inactions of operators acting as impediments to transformation and 
trading processes, a number of submissions identified prohibitions and other 
restrictions on transformation and/or trade that operators apply when assessing 
applications. These restrictions may be in the operator’s supply agreements with 
irrigators or the terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade, or they may not 
be documented.  
Restrictive provisions identified by the ACCC include: 
 fees and charges levied on the sale of water 
 restrictions based on the identity of the water purchaser 
 restrictions relating to state legislative requirements 
 restrictions relating to delivery management 
 restrictions relating to conveyancing losses 
 metering requirements 
 limits on trade out of an irrigation district 
 cut-off dates and trading seasons.  
Any restrictions likely to reduce trade may lead to inefficient market outcomes and may 
be inconsistent with the Basin water market and trading objectives and principles 
as set out in schedule 3 of the Act: 
(a) to facilitate the operation of efficient water markets and the opportunities for trading, 
within and between Basin States, where water resources are physically shared or 
hydrological connections and water supply considerations will permit water trading … 
The ACCC’s preliminary position is that there should be a general prohibition on 
restrictive provisions in an operator’s supply agreements (or associated terms and 
conditions) with customers that prevent or unreasonably delay transformation and/or 
trade. 
However, in some cases restrictions on transformation and/or trade are imposed for 
legitimate operational, regulatory or other compelling reasons. The position paper takes 
these into account by specifying five permitted restrictions:  
1. Administrative fees or charges for processing a transformation and/or trade or a 
regulated water charge as defined under the Act. 
2. Minimum water holding requirements for stock and domestic purposes. Some 
operators prevent irrigators from trading below specified minimum holding 
requirements. The ACCC considers such restrictions reasonable where the 
obligation is specified in state government legislative instruments. 
3. Metering requirements. Many submissions supported requirements for an 
irrigator to have a metered supply before allowing that irrigator to trade, except 
where the irrigator is terminating access to the operator’s network. Submissions 
noted that metering enables monitoring and detection of theft, more accurate 
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accounting for water and the provision of data to support efficiency 
improvements. 
4. Caps on the level of permanent water trade-out from irrigation districts. The 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in its meeting on 3 July 2008 stated 
its ambition to increase the cap from 4 to 6 per cent by the end of 2009. The 
position paper proposes allowing the cap agreed to by the federal government and 
state and territory governments. 
5. The requirement of security for the future payment of access fees (to be discussed 
separately). 
The ACCC considers the other restrictive conditions identified are unwarranted barriers 
to trade. The ACCC’s preliminary positions on restrictions on transformation and/or 
trade are listed in box 3. 
 
 
Box 3:  ACCC preliminary positions—restrictions on transformation and/or 
trade  
A general prohibition on restrictions 
1 Subject to limited explicit exceptions, provided for in the water market rules, an 
operator should not be permitted to impose any restrictions in contracts, arrangements 
or understandings.  
2 Prohibited restrictions on trade and/or transformation that may be imposed by 
operators include but are not limited to:  
 Any fees or charges levied on the transformation and/or trade of a water 
access entitlement except where the fee is an administrative fee or 
charge for processing a transformation and/or trade, calculated in 
accordance with the water market rules, or is a regulated water charge 
as defined under the Act. 
 Any restrictions based on the identity of the water purchaser. 
 Requirements to transform a separately held water access entitlement 
back into the scheme entitlement.  
 Requirement to maintain a minimum irrigation right on the 
transformation and/or trade, where this is not a requirement of a 
community service obligation contained in a state legislative 
instrument. 
 Restrictions relating to regulating land use and environmental effects of 
water use. 
 Restrictions relating to the category of the water entitlement. 
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Security 
The Act states that the water market rules may permit an operator to require security for 
payment of future charges.5 The ACCC has considered whether, and to what extent the 
water market rules should permit operators to seek security as a condition of trade.  
Some operators require security against the future payments of fees, often in the form 
of security over a portion of irrigators’ water rights. The water covered by the security 
cannot be traded and so this requirement can be considered to prevent or delay trade. 
These impediments need to be balanced against the legitimate interests of irrigation 
operators to mitigate the risks of non-payment of fees.  
The position paper proposes allowing operators to require security under certain 
circumstances. It also proposes allowing irrigators to offer security over something 
other than their water access entitlement and requiring the operator to give due 
consideration to the offer. The value of the security is capped at 50 per cent of the 
applicable termination fee.  
The ACCC’s preliminary positions on security are set out in box 4. 
                                                 
5  Water Act, s. 97(5) (a). 
 Restrictions to manage delivery and the physical constraints of the 
irrigation infrastructure, except where the transformed water 
entitlement is sold within the district. 
 Restrictions for the purposes of covering conveyance losses. 
 Imposition of cut-off dates and trading seasons.  
Permitted restrictions 
3. Administrative fees or charge for processing a transformation and/or trade, 
calculated in accordance with the water market rules, or a regulated water charge as 
defined under the Act. 
4. Restrictions that relate to minimum water holdings explicitly maintained for stock 
and domestic purposes, where this obligation is contained in a state legislative 
instrument. 
5. Requirements for an irrigator to have a metered supply before being permitted to 
transform and/or trade, except where the irrigator is terminating access to the 
operator’s network.  
6. The cap on permanent trade out of an irrigation district as agreed to by the federal 
government and state governments.  
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Box 4:  ACCC preliminary positions—security  
1. An operator should have the ability to seek security to mitigate the risk of an 
irrigator’s default on the future payment of access fees in specific circumstances. 
When security may be required 
2. An operator can only require security for future payment of fees when: 
 the irrigator will retain less than 20 per cent of their original water access 
entitlement, and 
 the infrastructure operator considers, on reasonable grounds, that there is a 
significant risk that the irrigator may be unable or unwilling to pay future access 
fees, when they fall due.  
3. Reasonable grounds include where an irrigator: 
 has been in arrears in failing to pay the access charge for a period of more than 
60 days on more than occasion in the last three years or 
 is a new landholder and has been a member of the scheme for fewer than three 
years. 
4. An operator may register a charge over 20 per cent of the irrigator’s water access 
entitlement upon transformation to protect its right to require security in the future.  
5. Under a registered charge, an operator must give its consent to the trade unless the 
operator concludes, on reasonable grounds, that there is a significant risk that the 
irrigator may be unable or unwilling to pay future access fees when they fall due. 
6. An operator must not require security for the future payment of access fees as a 
condition of the transformation of an irrigator’s irrigation right.  
Form security may take 
7. If an operator seeks security for future payment of fees, the irrigator has the option to 
offer the operator security over: 
 an unencumbered portion of the irrigator’s water access entitlement, or 
 a bank guarantee, or 
 a cash deposit to be used as a form of bond. 
8. If the irrigator offers one of these forms of security, the operator must give due 
consideration to that offer. 
9. In any other case, the operator may accept any other form of security as negotiated 
between the operator and the irrigator. 
Limit on level of security 
10. The value of security should be limited to the greater of: 
 50 per cent of the value of the termination fee as applied by the operator in 
accordance with the cap on termination fees provided under the water charge 
rules; or 
 where an operator does not charge a fee on termination, the value of the annual 
access fee multiplied by 1. 
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Application and implementation of water market rules 
All operators will need time to implement and give effect to the water market rules. 
This position paper proposes a transition process to give operators the time needed.  
The position paper proposes that all operators will be covered by the water market 
rules, subject to the provisions of the Act. Implementing arrangements that comply 
with the water market rules is likely to prove more onerous for small operators who 
have limited access to resources to help in the transition process. For this reason, and as 
touched on above, the ACCC will assist irrigation operators by developing standard 
forms and documents.  
The ACCC’s preliminary positions on application and implementation of the water 
market rules are set out in box 5.  
 
 
Box 5:  ACCC preliminary positions—application and implementation of the 
water market rules 
Application 
1. The water market rules should apply to all operators within the MDB, subject to the 
provisions of the Water Act. 
Implementation 
2. Transition to water market rules is proposed to occur according to the following 
timetable: 
 Stage 1—rules tabled to September 2009—implementation period for operators 
to amend contracts and other documents. During stage 1 operators must 
endeavour to ensure that they do not prevent or unreasonably delay 
transformation and/or trade. 
 Stage 2—September 2009 onwards—full enforceability of the water market rules 
and a yet-to-be-determined form of monitoring. 
Monitoring 
3. The ACCC proposes to keep reporting requirements to a minimum for the purposes 
of monitoring.  
4. The ACCC is developing the water market rules while having regard to the potential 
monitoring requirements and associated administrative burden on operators. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) extends across five states and territories and is 
Australia’s most important agricultural region.  
The Water Act 2007 (the Act), which came into effect on 3 March 2008, creates new 
institutional and governance arrangements to address the sustainability and 
management of water resources in the MDB. The Act builds on earlier reform 
initiatives, including the National Water Initiative (NWI)6 and the Murray-Darling 
Basin Agreement (MDBA). 
The Act creates new functions for the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) (see box 6). These include developing draft water market rules 
and water charge rules for consideration by the Minister for Climate Change and Water 
and advising the new MDB Authority on water trading rules. The Act also requires the 
ACCC to monitor compliance with, and enforce7, the water market rules and water 
charge rules.  
One of the main objectives of the NWI and the Act is to facilitate the operation of 
efficient water markets and the opportunities for water trading. The water market rules 
will contribute to this objective by ensuring that the policies and administrative 
requirements of irrigation infrastructure operators do not represent a barrier to trade. 
In other words, the water market rules will ensure that the water rights of irrigators are 
tradeable. 
On 4 April 2008 the ACCC released an issues paper on the water market rules for 
consultation. The issues paper invited stakeholders to provide comments on the issues 
that may be considered by the ACCC and inform the development of the ACCC advice 
to the minister. A total of 61 written submissions were received and these submissions 
have informed the preliminary positions presented in this paper.  
This paper details the ACCC’s preliminary positions on the water market rules. The 
ACCC welcomes submissions on the preliminary positions presented in this paper as 
well as any other relevant information that could assist and inform its advice to the 
minister.  
                                                 
6  The Intergovernmental Agreement on the National Water Initiative between the Australian 
Government and the governments of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory (as amended from 
time to time). The NWI (2004) built on the ‘Water Reform Framework’ agreed by COAG in 1994, 
which was incorporated within the National Competition Policy Agreement in 1995. 
7  Part 8 of the Act provides the ACCC with mechanisms to enforce water market rules and water 
charge rules. 
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Box 6:  Roles of the ACCC under the Water Act 2007 
 
1.1 Consultation process 
Consultation with stakeholders is an important part of the ACCC’s process in 
developing its advice to the minister. This position paper on the water market rules 
continues the consultation process that began with the release of the water market rules 
issues paper. 
Given the timeframe for the ACCC to develop its advice on water market rules, 
submissions need to be provided to the ACCC no later than Friday, 15 August 2008. 
There will be further opportunities to inform the ACCC’s development of water market 
rules before the preparation of final advice to the minister.  
Specifically, the ACCC proposes to:  
 release a draft of its advice that will incorporate draft rules and an accompanying 
draft report in October 2008 for further consultation  
 hold public forums with interested stakeholders in October 2008 to discuss the 
ACCC draft advice  
Water market rules
Water planning and management
Rules for water planning and
management charges across the 
MDB to give effect to principles of 
the Water Act, including user pays 
and pricing transparency.
Irrigation infrastructure 
0perator
Bulk water
Rules relating to actions of 
operators that restrict or 
unreasonably delay—
* transformation arrangements or 
* the subsequent trade of any 
transformed water access 
entitlement. 
Rules relating charges payable to 
an irrigation infrastructure operator 
for—
Rules relating to the charges 
levied for the provision of water 
storage and delivery services to 
downstream water users (e.g. 
irrigation infrastructure operators 
and rural town water authorities). 
Water trading rules
Rules to be included in the
Basin Plan for the trading or
transfer of tradeable water 
rights (i.e. water access rights, 
water delivery rights and
irrigation rights) relating to
basin surface and groundwater 
resources.
Advice to the minister
Advice to the 
minister Advice to the 
minister
Advice to MDB Authority
Water charge rules
Consider appropriate 
methodology, mechanisms,
structure and reporting 
requirements for regulated 
water charges  
* access, changing access, or  
  terminating access to an irrigation  
  network 
* services in relation to the above .
Advice to the minister
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 provide final advice on water market rules to the minister in December 2008. 
Submissions provided to the ACCC will be provided in full to the minister as part of 
the ACCC advice. 
1.2 Treatment of confidential information 
The ACCC prefers that all written submissions be publicly available to foster an 
informed, robust and consultative process. Accordingly, submissions will be considered 
to be public and will be posted on the ACCC website unless confidentiality is sought 
and obtained from the ACCC.  
Any information that parties would like to request the ACCC not to make publicly 
available should be provided in a separate document and clearly marked ‘Confidential’ 
on every page. Reasons must be provided to support the request for confidentiality.  
The ACCC will only accept a claim of confidentiality if the information is truly 
confidential in nature. Grounds on which confidentiality could be claimed include that 
the information disclosed is commercial in confidence and/or is non-public 
information. 
The ACCC will not accede to a request for confidentiality if it is not in the public 
interest to do so. If the ACCC considers the information should be disclosed (either 
because it is not confidential or because it would not be in the public interest to receive 
the information without public disclosure), the ACCC will provide the parties with an 
opportunity to withdraw the submission (or the part of the submission) containing the 
information. If the submission (or the part of the submission) is withdrawn, the ACCC 
may not take it into account. If a party elects not to withdraw the submission (or the 
part of the submission), the ACCC may disclose the information publicly.  
Any information accepted as confidential by the ACCC will not be publicly released by 
the ACCC, except where required as part of the provision of advice to the minister or 
where required by law (e.g. in response to a request under the Freedom of Information 
Act 1982 or a subpoena regarding proceedings between third parties). 
1.3 What is the role of the water market rules? 
The Water Bill 2007 Explanatory memorandum states that the purpose of the water 
market rules is to: 
free up the trade of water access rights within the Murray-Darling Basin by ensuring that 
the policies or administrative requirements of [irrigation] infrastructure operators do not 
represent a barrier to trade.8  
The water market rules must contribute to achieving the basin water market and trading 
objectives and principles specified in schedule 3 of the Act. 
                                                 
8  Explanatory memorandum to the Water Bill 2007, clause 97, paragraph 190, p. 28. 
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Water market rules may relate to an act that an operator does, or fails to do, in a way 
that prevents or unreasonably delays transformation arrangement being made or the 
trade of a transformed water access entitlement.9  
Broadly speaking, an irrigation infrastructure operator (‘operator’) is any person10 who 
owns or operates infrastructure for the purpose of delivering irrigation water to another 
person (i.e. an irrigator or other water user).11 The Act does not distinguish between 
operators on the basis of the size of the irrigation network, the number of irrigators12 
serviced or the volume of water rights held by the operator or their customers. 
Similarly, the definition of an irrigation infrastructure operator is not related to the 
operator’s governance structure.  
> Water market rules relate to the action or inactions of operators, not all market 
participants. 
Although many operators, particularly in South Australia and New South Wales, are 
owned by member irrigators, the operators have separate legal status to their members.  
In most cases, these operators own a ‘group’ water access entitlement13 and the member 
irrigators have a right to a share of water under an irrigation right14 against the operator 
(as conferred through their supply agreement).  
Transformation arrangements are those that allow a member irrigator to permanently 
transform their entitlement to water under an irrigation right against an operator into an 
independently held water access entitlement15, thereby reducing the share component of 
the operator’s water access entitlement. 
An individual may transform their irrigation right in order to trade the transformed 
entitlement, or they may simply prefer to hold an individual water access entitlement 
because they consider that it is of greater value than an entitlement to water under an 
irrigation right. For example, an individual entitlement may provide greater access to 
finance. 
In the absence of a legal requirement to act otherwise, an operator, as the owner of the 
group water access entitlement, can unilaterally prevent or delay any member from 
transforming their ‘share’ of the group entitlement into a separate water access 
entitlement.  
                                                 
9  Water Act, s. 97(1). 
10  ‘Person’ includes a body politic or corporate as well as an individual. 
11  Water Act, s. 7(4). 
12  For the purposes of this paper, an irrigator includes any person who receives water delivery services 
from an irrigation infrastructure operator. This may include a person who receives water for any 
purpose, such as for stock and domestic. 
13  For example, a ‘water access licence’ in New South Wales and a ‘water taking/holding allocation’ in 
South Australia. 
14  Water Act, s. 7(4). 
15  Held by someone other than the operator. 
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> Water market rules may limit or prohibit restrictions on transformation 
imposed by operators  
A transformation arrangement is also a necessary first step if an individual wishes to 
permanently trade their share of a group entitlement to anybody other than another 
group member.  
The water market rules can consider restrictions that an operator may impose on the 
trading or transferring (by a person who had an irrigation right against the operator) of 
a water access entitlement obtained as a result of transformation arrangements.16  
> Water market rules may limit or prohibit restrictions imposed by operators in 
relation to the trade of a transformed water access entitlement  
This paper will refer to conduct by operators relating to: 
 Transformation only—where a person who holds an irrigation right against an 
operator seeks to obtain a water access entitlement through transformation 
arrangements. 
 Transformation and trade—where a person who holds an irrigation right against an 
operator seeks to trade or transfer their share of the operator’s water access 
entitlement or water allocated to this entitlement. This could occur simultaneously 
with, or subsequent to, a transformation. 
For simplicity, these actions will be referred to as ‘transformation and/or trade’. 
Restrictions imposed by operators on the trade of irrigation rights by existing irrigation 
right holders that have not been subject to transformation do not appear to be within the 
scope of the water market rules. Therefore, the majority of water trading that currently 
occurs within an operator’s network will not be considered under the water market 
rules. 
> Water market rules cannot address restrictions imposed on the trade of 
irrigation rights, such as trade within an operator’s area of operations. 
Similarly, the temporary trade of water allocations associated with untransformed 
irrigation rights will not be considered under the water market rules. Therefore, many 
of the more general matters associated with the trade of water allocations 
(i.e. temporary trade) will extend beyond the scope of the water market rules. 
                                                 
16  Water Act, s. 97(3)(b). 
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The Act specifically identifies two actions of an operator that the water market rules 
cannot prohibit. These are where the operator: 
 imposes, or requires the payment of, a regulated water charge17; or 
 requires the approval of a person who holds a legal or equitable interest in an 
irrigation right that a person has against the operator before allowing transformation 
arrangements in relation to that irrigation right.18 
The ACCC also has a role in providing advice to the MDB Authority on the water 
trading rules. As with the water market rules, the water trading rules must contribute to 
achieving the basin water market and trading objectives and principles specified in 
schedule 3 of the Act.  
Water trading rules are to be included in the Basin Plan and may deal with matters such 
as the terms, process, manner and restrictions applied to the trade or transfer of water 
rights. Furthermore, they may deal with market institutional arrangements, including 
the availability of information to enable trade and the reporting of trade. The 
application of the water trading rules is likely to be much broader than that of the water 
market rules and may include state and territory governments and water intermediaries 
and brokers. Development of water trading rules will be managed through separate 
consultation processes and are not the subject of this paper.  
The ACCC considers that the Act provides sufficient clarity on the scope of the water 
market rules to suggest that broader trading issues extend beyond the scope of the water 
market rules. In addition, the water market rules are limited to the actions of operators 
and any provisions in the water market rules to cover trading matters would not apply 
as broadly as would be required.  
Nevertheless, the ACCC recognises the importance of the broader trading issues, and 
will consider the existence, nature and extent of any deficiencies in current 
arrangements in its advice to the MDB Authority on the water trading rules. This could 
include matters relating to the following issues:  
 availability of market information 
 registers and accounts 
 interaction between operators and intermediaries. 
The water market rules issues paper noted that the process of transforming an irrigation 
right into a water access entitlement may have tax implications for both operators and 
irrigators. The ACCC has informed the Australian Tax Office of the potential tax 
implications associated with transformation and does not intend to comment on this 
matter any further at this stage. 
                                                 
17  Water Act, s. 97(6)(a). Regulated water charge is defined in s. 91 of the Act. 
18  Water Act, s. 97(6)(b). 
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2. Facilitating transformation and/or trade 
As the owner of the group water access entitlement, an operator can unilaterally 
prevent or delay any member from transforming their share of the group entitlement 
into a separate water access entitlement.  
Some submissions pointed to actions or inactions of operators that could be considered 
to delay or prevent trade. For example, the Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia 
identified an operator who requires a full member meeting to approve an annual trade.19 
Another stakeholder commented on the subjective and discretionary policies, reflected 
in the terms and conditions administered by operators. It was submitted that these 
arrangements confer too much discretion on the operator to approve transfers and 
trades.20 Other submissions considered that operators should not be able to 
unreasonably refuse to sign documentation that enables such sales or prevent these 
sales in other ways.21  
One irrigator estimated that his inability to gain access to his irrigation right has 
resulted in an ongoing 10-year legal battle with the operator and has cost more than 
$150 000.22 
The ACCC proposes establishing an obligation on operators to assist individual 
irrigators in transforming and/or trading their transformed entitlements in the water 
market rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19  Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 5. 
20  Mr Ian Shippen, submission 41, p. 1. 
21  P J and P B Goudie, submission 8, pp. 2–4; Mr Thomas McCallum, submission 4, p.1. 
22  P J and P B Goudie, submission 8, p. 3. 
An operator must do all things necessary to facilitate transformation and/or trade of all or 
part of an irrigator’s entitlement in accordance with the water market rules. 
An operator must not prevent or unreasonably delay transformation of all or part of an 
irrigator’s entitlement under any circumstances, other than in accordance with the water 
market rules. 
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3. Operators’ terms and conditions for  
 approving transformation and/or trade 
The terms and conditions governing an operator’s approval processes for 
transformation and/or trade may be contained in its supply agreements with irrigators.23 
Otherwise the supply agreement may point to separately documented policies or the 
terms and conditions associated with transformation and/or trade may not be 
documented at all. 
An operator’s terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade approval may 
typically include: 
 details of the operator’s approval process 
 matters the operator considers in assessing the application 
 obligations of the parties involved in the transaction 
 any administrative fees associated with the application. 
Clearly defined, transparent terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade 
support these outcomes by protecting property rights and reducing transaction costs.  
3.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
3.1.1 Clearly stated terms and conditions 
A number of stakeholders commented that policies to support transformation and/or 
trade varied considerably between operators.24 In addition, some stakeholders submitted 
that these terms and conditions should be comprehensive, clear and unambiguous, and 
that where they are not, this may create confusion, introduce market distortions and 
result in a lower level of transformation and trading activity.25 
Smaller operators were identified as having fewer prescribed terms and conditions for 
transformation and/or trade than larger operators.26 This appears consistent with the 
                                                 
23  An operator’s supply agreement with irrigators could be defined in the arrangements governing the 
shareholder/trustee relationship (where an operator’s shareholders are also their customers) and/or 
the arrangements governing the ownership of the share of the water entitlement. 
24  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 7; National Farmers Federation, submission 41, p. 9; Sunraysia 
Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 4; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 4. 
25  Renmark Irrigation Trust, submission 47, p. 2; West Corurgan Board of Management, submission 
50, p. 3; National Farmers Federation, submission 41, p. 9; Minerals Council of Australia, 
submission 39, p. 8; State Government of Victoria, submission 61, p. 6; Water for Rivers, 
submission 51, p. 7; New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, p. 6. 
26  Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 5.  
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views of a number of stakeholders that many smaller operators do not provide 
transformation and trading information and do not allow trading at all.27  
Some stakeholders suggested that a model contract or minimum set of standards should 
be developed or mandated, and should require operators to define and provide clear and 
comprehensive processes, terms and conditions, and arrangements for transformation 
and/or trade.28 
3.1.2 Transparency and accessibility 
Several stakeholders recommended that terms and conditions for transformation and/or 
trade should be fully disclosed and readily available to external parties and operator 
customers.29 Submissions noted that where possible these terms should remain 
relatively stable over time30, and that enhanced communication and knowledge of terms 
and conditions for transformation and/or trade would enable efficient trading because 
irrigators could make better informed trading decisions.31 
In regard to current practice, stakeholders noted that terms are located in a variety of 
documents, which vary from operator to operator and are generally not clearly specified 
or communicated. Similarly, the means by which these documents are distributed, 
publicised or made accessible may vary.32 Another stakeholder considered that the 
complexity created by these arrangements results in increased transaction costs and can 
lead to lower rates of transformation.33  
3.1.3 Process for changing terms and conditions  
Some stakeholders noted that the while policies should not constantly change, they 
should have the ability to unilaterally vary the terms and conditions to ensure they keep 
pace with legislative and commercial realities and company objectives.34  
Several stakeholders noted that board members or directors are elected by members and 
are responsible for setting policy, which means that member approval is not generally 
required.35 Murray Irrigation Limited noted that while policy is initially endorsed by its 
                                                 
27  Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 2; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 4; National 
Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 9. 
28  South Australian Farmers Federation, submission 42, p. 5; Minerals Council of Australia, 
submission 39, p. 8. 
29  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 32; Murray-Darling Basin Commission, submission 
59, p. 2; Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 7; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 6; PJ 
and P B Goudie, submission 8, pp. 1, 4.  
30  D W Sehestedt, submission 5, p. 1. 
31  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 8. 
32  P J and P B Goudie, submission 8, p. 1; Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 7. 
33  State Government of Victoria, submission 61, p. 6.  
34  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. ii; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11,  
pp. 30–33; Narromine Irrigation Board of Management, submission 33, p. 10; Murrumbidgee 
Irrigation, submission 44, p. 6; Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 7. 
35  Narromine Irrigation Board of Management, submission 33, p. 10; Western Murray Irrigation, 
submission 11, p. 32; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 4; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, 
submission 17, p. 4.  
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board, where required it seeks ratification by a general meeting of shareholders before 
the policy is adopted in operating procedures and put into practice.36  
However, one stakeholder noted that Murray Irrigation Limited’s: 
rules and the way they continually change them is having a detrimental impact on my 
business … and have eroded my property right.37 
Water for Rivers suggested that there should be a process of review by the ACCC: 
where any party can bring forward an operator rule deemed to be non-competitive or against 
open and free trade for determination and appropriate … action.’38  
Alternatively, one stakeholder suggested operators should consult with its member 
irrigators before amending its terms of trade39, and another suggested the operator must 
be accountable to members for such changes.40  
3.2 Preliminary position 
Under-developed or inadequate terms and conditions to support the transformation 
and/or trade of water entitlements are likely to result in increased uncertainty, higher 
transaction costs for irrigators and constitute a barrier to transformation and/or trade.  
Accordingly, operators should have policies in place to support transformation and/or 
trade. While operators face resource constraints, any imposed administrative burden 
will not be ongoing.  
To the extent that terms and conditions exist, they appear in a range of documents, 
which are then publicised in different forms. In the interests of promoting transparency, 
accessibility and informed decision-making by irrigators, there is merit in a more 
rationalised and simple format. 
Operators should ensure that the terms and conditions are set out in a straightforward 
manner. This document should be published on the operator’s website or otherwise 
made readily available, and operators should notify their customers of the existence of 
the document. 
While terms and conditions need to be sufficiently flexible to ensure they remain 
relevant over time, the frequency and nature of changes can be problematic.  
Many of these changes may be required to reflect changing legislative requirements; 
however, it appears that changes may also have been made to the terms and conditions 
for transformation and/or trade simply to protect the commercial interests of operators 
                                                 
36  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. iii. 
37  Mr Ian Shippen, submission 36, p. 1.  
38  Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 7. 
39  D W Sehestedt, submission 5, p. 1. 
40  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 6. 
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and residual members. This could be at the expense of an individual irrigator and the 
interests of MDB stakeholders more broadly. 
Operators should consult with affected parties about any change to terms and 
conditions for transformation and/or trade that may materially affect them. For changes 
that are more administrative in nature and are unlikely to materially impact irrigators, 
the operator should still be required to inform its members.  
As part of developing the water market rules, the ACCC will consider whether it is 
appropriate to provide guidance to operators about the circumstances and processes for 
changing terms and conditions.  
 
 
 
Operators should have in place clearly stated terms and conditions to facilitate 
transformation and/or trade.  
The terms and conditions relating to transformation and/or trade approvals should: 
 be readily available to all parties and rationalised where possible  
 be published on the operator’s website (if applicable) and customers of the 
operator should be notified in writing of the existence of these documents. 
Operators should clearly define and document the process associated with making any 
required changes to the terms and conditions relating to transformation and/or trade 
approvals (the ACCC may also provide guidance to operators on the appropriateness of the 
process undertaken to implement such changes). 
Operators must consult with irrigators who may be materially affected by a change to the 
terms and conditions (the ACCC may also provide guidance to operators on what could be 
considered ‘material’). 
Operators must notify irrigators of all changes to their terms and conditions. 
In consulting with or notifying irrigators, operators should outline the reasons for the 
proposed change and supply supporting documentation if applicable.  
At the completion of the transitory adjustment period of the water market rules (date TBC), 
an operator must notify all its irrigators in writing of the application of the water market 
rules; specifically, an information pack that includes a copy of the water market rules and 
applicable transformation application forms should be provided to irrigators. 
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4. Transformation and/or trade administrative 
process 
As noted in chapter 3, an operator’s terms and conditions for transformation and/or 
trade may include details about the operator’s administrative processes for 
transformation and/or trade. 
In general a transformation and/or trade administrative process would involve: 
 An irrigator applying to their operator to transform and/or trade their irrigation 
rights, typically by completing the relevant application forms. 
 Approval by the operator of the transformation and/or trade of the irrigation right. 
In considering applications, the operator will consider compliance of the application 
with provisions contained in the terms and conditions governing approval.  
 The operator applying on behalf of the irrigator to the relevant state department for 
the transformation and/or trade of the irrigator’s share of the operator’s water access 
entitlement. 
 Approval by the relevant state department. 
 Updating the operator’s irrigation right register and, where applicable, renegotiating 
any ongoing delivery arrangements. 
An operator is involved in all bar one stage of this process—approval by the relevant 
state department. 
A lack of clearly defined, comprehensive and efficient administrative processes may 
prevent or unreasonably delay the transformation and/or trade of an individual’s 
irrigation right. Specific actions may be required of an operator in processing an 
application for transformation and/or trade of an irrigation right. 
Providing irrigators with information about the application and approval processes can 
reduce transaction costs and facilitate the operation of efficient markets. 
The practice of transformation is not often performed as a separate process and 
stakeholder submissions primarily relate to trading processes; however, the 
transformation process should be similar. 
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4.1 Application process 
4.1.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Western Murray Irrigation, Murray Irrigation Limited and Murrumbidgee Irrigation all 
advised that their procedures for processing applications for transformation and/or trade 
closely reflect those set out in on p. 26 of the water market rules issues paper.41 
Many submissions supported standardising application forms for transformation and/or 
trade.42 This would help to facilitate trade by reducing transaction costs, creating a more 
streamlined service43 and allowing dealings between individual irrigators and operators 
and between operators and operators to become easier.44 It was also suggested that 
standardised forms may assist licensed brokers to provide a cost-effective service 
across Australia.45  
Some submissions noted that if standardised forms for transformation and/or trade were 
developed, these would need to be sound, include all relevant information and be 
agreed to by the operators46, and that the approach should be in line with the land titles 
registry requirements.47  
Stakeholders also pointed out potential issues with the use of standardised application 
forms, including the difficulty in developing them because of differences in the class 
and deliverability of water 48 and jurisdictional requirements.49  
4.1.2 Information required by operators 
Many stakeholders made submissions on the contents of application forms when a 
standardised approach is applied. For permanent trade, several operators advised that 
they required the following minimum information: 
Murray Irrigation Ltd— 
 details of the vendor and purchaser 
 the volume to be traded 
 original water entitlement certificates 
                                                 
41  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 34; Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 34; 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
42  Western Murray Irrigation submission 11, p. 35; Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, 
submission 15, p. 4; Ricegrowers Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 6; Murray Irrigation 
Limited, submission 40, p. 35; West Corurgan, submission 50, p. 4; Macquarie River Food and 
Fibre, submission 53, p. 14. 
43  National Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 10. 
44  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 35. 
45  Ricegrowers Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 6. 
46  Western Murray Irrigation submission 11, p. 35. 
47  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 14. 
48  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 7. 
49  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
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 land title searches and affirmation of encumbrances (where applicable) 
 transfer stamped by the Office of State Revenue when stamp duty is due.50 
Western Murray Irrigation— 
 confirmation of ownership 
 the original signatures of all owners 
 no outstanding debts with the operator 
 approval from third party interests.51 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation— 
 complete description of what the applicant proposes 
 the current status of the water entitlement 
 completed application forms.52 
West Corurgan Board of Management— 
 third party consent.53 
4.1.3 Information required by applicants 
To properly complete an application for transformation and/or trade, the applicant also 
requires certain information from the operator, which may not currently be readily 
available.54 Stakeholders considered this could include a clear proof of title, volume of 
allocations (current and future)55, rules of transformation and/or trade, the operator’s 
assessment of any breaches of those rules, processes that must be completed and forms 
that must be provided.56 
Several stakeholders noted some of this information is currently made available to 
irrigators on request, either free57 or at charge58, while other operators issue a certificate 
containing some of this information.59  
                                                 
50  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 35. 
51  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 35. 
52  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
53  West Corurgan, submission 50, p. 4. 
54  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 7. 
55  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 7. 
56  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
57  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 35. 
58  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 34. 
59  Jemalong Irrigation Limited currently issues a certificate to its members specifying the shares held 
(and the payment details related to those shares) and the corresponding water entitlements in 
accordance with its articles of association. 
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4.1.4 Preliminary position 
The approval processes for transformation and/or trade appear to differ from operator 
to operator. Streamlining these processes would benefit all participants and would 
facilitate efficient water markets. 
The standardisation of application forms would provide for a more consistent and 
simple process, reducing processing times and transaction costs, thereby facilitating 
transformation and/or trade.  
However, different jurisdictional requirements need to be considered. The ACCC 
proposes that a base set of forms be developed for the process of transformation and/or 
trade based on the varying state obligations and requirements. It is not proposed that 
these standardised forms would be included as part of the market rules, rather that they 
would be circulated as guidelines during the implementation of the market rules. 
It appears that much of the information requested by operators is not necessary for the 
successful processing of applications for transformation and/or trade. Restricting the 
type of information sought by operators would reduce the burden placed on applicants 
in ensuring that they have submitted a complete application. It would also benefit 
operators by reducing paperwork and simplifying the verification process. The use of 
standard forms may assist in this regard.  
The basic information required for a transformation and/or trade application is 
described below. Unnecessary information—such as details about the applicant’s 
reasons for transformation and/or trade—should not be required by an operator.  
To confirm the minimum information required, the ACCC requires more information 
about the specific requirements of the various state and territory authorities. 
Information necessary for applicants to properly complete an application for 
transformation and/or trade should be readily obtainable from operators on request.  
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4.2 Timeliness of process 
4.2.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
A number of submissions highlighted the importance of timeliness in the 
transformation and/or trade of water. Administrative procedures will necessarily take 
time in order to ensure the integrity of a water register.60 However, it was submitted that 
quite often approval processes are not undertaken in an efficient manner61and there is 
often an urgent need for water, with extended delays threatening crops and livestock.62 
It was also noted that processing delays by operators have eroded confidence in the 
market, hindering the development of more diverse water products.63 
Stakeholders provided various examples of the sort of delays experienced in the 
processing of trades. Citrus Growers of South Australia stated that while payment is 
made upfront or within 48 hours, some irrigators have had to wait up to 60 days for 
                                                 
60  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 36. 
61  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 8. 
62  Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 3; United Dairy Farmers of Victoria, 
submission 29, p. 3.  
63  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 3. 
Operators must develop a base set of forms for both transformation applications and 
transformation and trade applications. The basic information required for both processes 
may include: 
 applicant details 
 account number 
 confirmation of identity 
 the number and type of units/volume to be transformed  
 confirmation that all fees have been paid. 
For transformation and trade, additional information may also include: 
 buyer details including details of any existing water access entitlement for the 
transformed units to be appended to. 
 the number and type of units/volume of water to be traded. 
An operator must not request from applicants details relating to the purpose for 
transformation and/or trade. 
An operator must make information regarding the applicant’s water right readily available 
upon request and within a reasonable time frame.  
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confirmation of a trade.64 In a specific example, it took two years to complete a single 
water trade.65 
Many operators submitted that trades of water allocations are generally processed 
within one to two  business days66 because there is often an urgent need for water and 
the administration process is less onerous.67 
Submissions highlighted that water transformations and water entitlement trades are 
more complex, which means that an appropriate level of care needs to be taken and 
approval times vary.68 Submissions suggested timeframes for approval of permanent 
trade ranged from 10 to 15 days 69, to three weeks70 and up to three months.71 
It was suggested that timeframes should be structured in a manner similar to those for 
land transactions 72 or resemble the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) standard 
settlement time of three days. 73  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation submitted that it and most other operators in New South 
Wales have regularly ranked highly in terms of trade processing speed.74 The South 
Australia Farmers’ Federation also noted that unbundling of water rights is expected to 
address current delays of trade into South Australia because of jurisdictional 
requirements that prohibit trade until salinity and drainage assessment is complete. 75 
A large number of the submissions received supported the imposition of time limits for 
processing transformation and trade applications to improve efficiency and reduce 
transaction costs.76 
However, one stakeholder suggested that it may not always be possible to adhere to 
strict time limits.77 In addition, the prescription of time limits could act to slow average 
                                                 
64  Citrus Growers of South Australia, submission 16, p. 1. 
65  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 9. See also Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 8; 
Waterexchange, submission 45, p. 3. 
66  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 36 (48 hours); Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 
40, p. 36 (one business day). 
67  Murray Irrigation Limited noted that it does not require board approval for temporary trades, with 
only simple checks of the application being undertaken. See further Murray Irrigation Limited, 
submission 40, p. 35. 
68  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 15. 
69  Queensland Farmers Federation and Queensland Irrigators Council, submission 58, p. 6. 
70  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 36. 
71  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 3. 
72  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 10; Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 
53, p. 14. 
73  Waterfind, submission 57, p. 2; Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 15. 
74  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
75  South Australia Farmers’ Federation, submission 42, p. 4. 
76  Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, submission 15, p. 5; Western Murray Irrigation, 
submission 11, p. 36; Victorian Farmers’ Federation, submission 54, p. 10. See also Goulburn 
Broken Catchment Management Authority, submission 12, p. 2. Ricegrowers Association of 
Australia, submission 26, p. 6; New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, p. 9; National 
Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 10; 
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processing times because ‘the lowest common denominator would be adopted.’78 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation acknowledged this issue; however, it noted that ‘operators can 
and currently do significantly exceed such benchmarks’, and also suggested that time 
limits could be reviewed and subsequently reduced.79 Some stakeholders suggested 
time limits should consider operators’ limited resources80, size and the number of 
applications received.81  
It was noted that in some jurisdictions approval is also required by the relevant state 
authority. Western Murray Irrigation stated that any trades out of its district would 
involve a reduction in its licence, and the New South Wales Department of Water and 
Energy would thus be required to complete the process.82  
Several submissions stated that delays in processing times are generally because of the 
actions of government agencies and the seller and buyer, not the private sector.83  
Stakeholders generally agreed that timeframes for processing transformations and 
trades should commence upon the lodgement of a correctly completed application 
form.84 The point at which the time frame should conclude is less clear. A number of 
suggestions were provided including when the legal transfer documents are delivered to 
relevant parties and any transaction costs and termination fees paid85; when all fees 
have been received and the operator’s register has been updated86; and when final 
approval has been obtained from the relevant government agency.87  
Submissions noted that information on processing times is not generally provided to 
market participants.88 However, Western Murray Irrigation noted that some water 
exchanges attempt to track approval time89, and there was some support for operators 
monitoring and reporting on timeframes.90  
Some operators require final board approval before finalising water entitlement trades.91 
In other instances, approval has been delegated, either to management or the chief 
                                                                                                                                              
77  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 36. 
78  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 8. 
79  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 8. 
80  Murray-Darling Basin Commission, submission 59, p. 2. 
81  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 36. 
82  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 34. 
83  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 15; West Corurgan Board of Management, submission 50, p. 4; 
Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 9; Murray Irrigation Limited , submission 40, 
p. 36. 
84  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 14; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, 
p. 36; West Corurgan Board of Management, submission 50, p. 4. 
85  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 14. 
86  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 36. 
87  West Corurgan, submission 50, p. 4. 
88  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 9; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 37. 
89  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 37. 
90  New South Wales Irrigators Council, submission 31, p. 9; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, 
p. 8. 
91  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 34; Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 35. 
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executive officer 92 or another senior executive.93 The Bondi Group supported the 
notion of board approval for all large permanent trades.94  
While one stakeholder noted that requiring board approval politicises the process, 
acting as a lever to control water movement95, others submitted that board approval 
ensures that no company rules are breached and enables the endorsement of the record 
in the water registers.96  
4.2.2 Preliminary position 
Time limits 
At present, the time taken by operators to process and give effect to transformation 
and/or trade approvals varies significantly. This process may be inefficient in some 
instances.  
Currently, no prescribed time limits exist. Implementing binding time lines for 
transformation and/or trade processes would benefit all market participants because it 
would improve efficiency in the market and lower transaction costs associated with the 
process. While the time limits imposed should take account of what is considered to be 
best practice, they should also be practical and cost-effective.  
Concerns were raised about the ability of some operators to meet strict time limits 
because of their lack of administrative resources and protocols or other unforeseen 
occurrences. However, by establishing clear and comprehensive procedures for 
transformation and/or trade—such as standardising application forms, streamlining 
processes and defining information requirements of operators—many delays would 
appear to be avoidable. 
While any universal time limits applied may be longer than the processing time 
currently being achieved by some operators, it is unlikely that this will cause efficient 
operators to reduce their efficiency or to change their current practices. Time limits will 
pull the less efficient operators into line with the more efficient. To encourage 
efficiency in the approval process, time limits could be subject to periodic review.  
Western Murray Irrigation considered that, when determining applicable time limits, 
consideration should be given to the size of the operator and the number of 
applications. However, there is a strong argument that all operators should be subject to 
the same approval time limits. Whilst larger operators may be required to process a 
larger volume of applications, they are more likely to have better resources and 
administration practices in place than smaller operators. Conversely, while not having 
the same resources as a larger operator, a smaller operator would have fewer 
applications. Standardised application forms would also assist small operators in this 
matter.  
                                                 
92  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 8. 
93  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 34; Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 35. 
94  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 14. 
95  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 7. 
96  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 35. 
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The approval process for transformation and/or trade generally consists of a number of 
steps, some of which rely on the actions of third parties, such as government. For this 
reason, separate time limits have been established for three distinct components of the 
approval process that involve action only by the operator. Time taken by any applicable 
third party involved in the approval process has not been included in the time limits 
proposed. 
Board approval 
In addition to the initial information requirements and procedures regarding the 
application process, transformation and/or trade of a water entitlement may be subject 
to final approval by a board or senior executive. The practice of requiring board 
approval varies among operators. Requiring board approval can draw out 
transformation and/or trade approval processes.  
The ACCC has refrained from prescribing a specific approval procedure for operators 
to follow for parties that may approve transformation and/or trade. Operators will be 
free to determine whether board approval is a necessary step in their approval 
processes. However, the prescribed time limits must be adhered to irrespective of the 
approval process adopted by the operator.  
 
Operators must process applications efficiently and not unduly delay the approval process. 
Time limits for operators processing transformation and/or trade applications are as follows: 
 Initial assessment period—upon lodgement of an application, the operator must ensure 
that the application has been properly completed and request further details as required 
within three business days. 
 Approval period—upon acceptance of a correctly completed application, the operator 
must process the application within 10 business days, including completion of the 
following steps: 
 processing and checking of the application 
 final approval by the operator 
 advising the applicant of the status of the application. 
 Referral of application to the relevant jurisdictional authority for further approval 
(where applicable). 
 Updating the register—once the operator has been advised of the final approval, it must 
ensure that the relevant register has been updated within two business days. 
These time limits do not include any time taken by the relevant jurisdictional authorities in 
approving a transformation and/or trade.  
These time limits apply irrespective of an operator’s approval procedure or the size of the 
operator. 
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4.3 Administrative fees and charges 
Operators may incur costs as a result of enacting transformation and/or trade processes. 
However, the imposition of excessive administrative fees and charges can increase 
transaction costs and therefore impede the operation of water markets. 
4.3.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Two stakeholders commented on the negative impact high administration fees and 
charges may have on market liquidity.97 Another submission noted that changes in 
government policy positions increase administrative costs, therefore increasing 
administrative fees and charges.98 
A number of stakeholders considered their current administrative fees and charges to be 
minimal99 and generally reflective of costs associated with providing transformation 
and/or trade transaction services.100 Others noted that in comparison to the value of a 
water transaction, administrative fees were negligible.101 Murray Irrigation Limited 
stated that its fees are transaction-based rather then unit-based, and that it does not 
charge fees for annual transfers or for the use of its exchange, as these are both 
considered to be core services.102  
In contrast, the Australian Water Brokers Association considered that the level of fees 
and charges is not in line with administrative costs, citing large differences in fees 
between operators as evidence of this. 103  
The basis of fees and charges 
The majority of submissions were of the view that that administrative fees and charges 
for processing a transformation and/or trade should be based on cost recovery.104  
While one stakeholder supported a prescriptive approach105, the general view was that 
prescribed fees may not be appropriate because of the market structure and range of 
                                                 
97  Waterfind, submission 57, p. 4; Australian Conservation Foundation, submission 23, pp. 9–10. 
98  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 12. 
99  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 6; Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, 
p 12; West Corurgan, submission 50, p. 3. 
100  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 13; Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 30; 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 6; Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, 
p. 12. 
101  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 12; Western Murray Irrigation submission 11, p. 28. 
102  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 29. 
103  Australian Water Brokers Association, submission 24, p. 10. 
104  Australian Water Brokers Association, submission 24, p. 10; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 
11, pp. 27–28; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 4; Queensland Bulk Water Supply 
Authority, submission 15, p. 4; Australian Conservation Foundation, submission 23, p. 16; National 
Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 8; West Corurgan Board of Management, submission 50, 
p. 3; Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 12; Murray-Darling Basin Commission, 
submission 59, p. 2; Australian Conservation Foundation, submission 23, pp. 9–10. 
105  Thomas McCallum, submission 4, p. 1. 
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different cost structures that exist for operators.106 Similarly, the New South Wales 
Irrigators Council considered that prescribing fees and charges is beyond the scope of 
the ACCC’s role.107 The Minerals Council of Australia advised the ACCC to exercise 
caution in developing water market rules in this area to avoid unnecessary cost 
implications.108 
The Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority supported an approach whereby the 
seller would bear the administrative costs associated with the trade process on the basis 
that the beneficiaries of a trade should ‘bear the full cost of supporting their market and 
this shouldn’t be borne by customers who don’t access the market.’109  
However, this view was not supported by the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF). The 
NFF were of the view that irrigators should not be required to pay for the use of 
‘antiquated and labour intensive trade processes’, and suggested that water trades 
should be facilitated by electronic exchanges.110 
The Murray-Darling Basin Commission suggested that administrative fees and charges 
should be reviewed regularly ‘against an agreed set of best practice standards’.111  
The Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia submitted that government and operator 
charges should be standardised across all jurisdictions, with the relevant information 
being made available on the internet. 112  
A number of suggestions were offered for reducing transaction costs associated with 
transformation and/or trade. These include electronic service delivery 113 and the 
implementation of a national registry.114  
4.3.2 Preliminary position 
The processes to facilitate transformation and/or trade require operators to use internal 
resources. Operators should be reimbursed for this activity.  
Administrative fees and charges should be based solely on the recovery of costs. Fees 
and charges in excess of the cost of service provision are not appropriate and give rise 
to inefficient transformation and/or trading outcomes.  
The principle of cost recovery should preclude an operator from imposing fees and 
charges for administrative processes for which it has already been compensated by a 
government agency.  
                                                 
106  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 4. See also Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 12. 
107  NSW Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, p. 8. 
108  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 4. 
109  Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, submission 15, p. 4. 
110  National Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 8. 
111  Murray-Darling Basin Commission, submission 59, p. 2. 
112  Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 4. 
113  New South Wales Farmers Association, submission 60, p. 3. 
114  Australian Property Institute, submission 37, p. 3. 
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Operators are best placed to set administration fees and charges that recover costs, not 
increase profits.  
Operators should provide information to irrigators regarding any applicable 
administrative charges associated with processing transformation and/or trade 
arrangements to better inform irrigators’ decisions concerning transformation. 
 
 
Any administrative fees and charges for processing a transformation and/or trade must be 
based on cost recovery. 
Any administrative fees for processing a transformation and/or trade must be contained 
within an operator’s terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade.  
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5. Enabling transformation separate to trade 
Currently, many irrigators own a right to water through shares in their operator’s group 
water entitlement. Irrigators may wish to hold the right to water directly, without 
necessarily trading their water. This process of transforming shares of a group 
entitlement into individually held entitlements can be accomplished separately to 
trading that water.  
In its own right, transformation produces a number of benefits, including more clearly 
defined, independent statutory rights to water, improved mortgageability and 
streamlined future trade. However, operators may be concerned about the increased 
administrative burden of allowing transformation, and irrigators may be concerned 
about accessing a fair delivery contract if they choose to continue irrigating after 
transformation. This chapter contains some preliminary views on these issues.  
5.1 Benefits of transformation 
5.1.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Clearly defined water rights 
Several stakeholders supported the transformation of irrigation rights into separately 
held water access entitlements115 and submitted that operators should not be allowed to 
prevent transformation.116 Transformation would develop a deeper, more flexible and 
transparent market better able to respond to the circumstances of individual 
businesses117 and forms: 
the basis of a robust and transparent set of rights that would provide clarity to water 
users and ensure that the potential gains from water trade are realized.118 
However, the Ricegrowers Association of Australia submitted that transformation 
should not enable irrigators to avoid charges that faced by remaining members.119  
Mortgageability 
Several stakeholders confirmed that while finance is achievable under a group 
entitlement, it is more difficult and costly to obtain.120  
                                                 
115  PJ and PB Goudie, submission 8, pp. 3–4; Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 
6; Minerals Council of Australia submission 39, pp. 3, 9; National Farmers’ Federation, submission 
41, p. 10. 
116  PJ and PB Goudie, submission 8, p. 3. 
117  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 3. 
118  Victorian Farmers’ Federation, submission 54, p. 9. 
119  Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 6.  
120  P J and P B Goudie, submission 8, p. 3; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 5; Sunraysia 
Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 6; Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 11. 
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The Australian Banker’s Association submitted that untransformed group entitlements 
do not afford the equivalent protection to financiers when compared with individually 
held statutory water access entitlements.121 Group entitlements are subject to operators 
rules, which can change often and without notice. Some operators rules do not 
recognise a financier’s interests, do not recognise multiple financial interests or give 
their own financial interests against the irrigator priority over those of financiers. 122 
However, the Australian Banker’s Association submitted that it should not be left to 
financial institutions to move the reform process forward by requiring transformed 
rights as security.123 
The National Farmers’ Federation submitted that water reform was eroding the 
perceptions of security of group property rights over time in favour of individually held 
rights.124 The Narromine Irrigation Board of Management also anticipated that financial 
institutions will increasingly require individual water entitlements as security and will 
be less likely to rely on informal arrangements with operators (such as correspondence 
only) 125 
Pioneer Valley Water Co-operative, a member of the Bondi Group, submitted that not 
all financial institutions agree with the position of the Australian Bankers’ Association. 
Pioneer argued that there is more security in untransformed entitlements as membership 
of an irrigation corporation provides ‘a level of protection from outside forces in water 
management.’126 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation and Macquarie River Food and Fibre submitted that they had 
no evidence that transformed entitlements provided irrigators with easier or cheaper 
access to finance or more favourable terms and conditions for that finance.127 Macquarie 
River Food and Fibre said that this was because individual irrigator’s rights under 
group entitlements in the Macquarie schemes are clearly specified and documented 
already.128 Murrumbidgee Irrigation noted it had not received any complaints from 
members to date on this issue.129 
Sunraysia Citrus Growers submitted that operators will not be able to obtain 
competitive financing themselves unless they continue to hold group water 
entitlements.130 
                                                 
121  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 11. 
122  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 11. 
123  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 6. 
124  National Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 11. 
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126  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 16. 
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p. 15. 
128  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 15. 
129  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, pp. 2, 9. 
130  Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 6. 
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Streamline trade processes 
Several submissions noted that a benefit of transformation is that any subsequent trade 
will be expedited.131 Macquarie River Food and Fibre rejected the suggestion that 
operators hold ‘restrictive powers’ over individuals wanting to trade water out of 
schemes.132  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation submitted that transformation is not necessary to enable 
export.133 It suggested that the export of a group entitlement can be processed just as 
easily as an individually held entitlement, because the trade occurs directly between 
two operators who merely amend their group entitlements.134  
Central Irrigation Trust noted that having transformed and un-transformed customers 
would cause increased administrative costs, because of their different reporting, 
monitoring and membership characteristics.135  
5.1.2 Preliminary position 
Transformation can assist in establishing more clearly defined water rights for 
irrigators, increasing the security and mortgageability of such property and streamlining 
future trading processes. 
Through transformation an irrigator’s right to water is converted from a contractual 
right with the operator to a statutory right. A transformed water access entitlement, as a 
statutory right, will be registered on the relevant state government water registry, 
increasing the security of the title. Where not transformed, the irrigation rights of 
individual irrigators under group entitlement arrangements can often be ill-defined. 
Therefore, transformation is a fundamental step toward a more robust water market.  
While opinions in submissions diverge on the issue of whether transformation enhances 
an irrigator’s access to finance, on balance, having the option to transform can only 
improve an irrigator’s finance prospects.  
Transformation can occur simultaneously to trade and this process need not necessarily 
involve the creation of a separate individual water access entitlement. However, this 
does not negate the benefits of transforming separately to trade. This is particularly true 
for irrigators who may wish to trade a portion of their water entitlements in the future. 
The ACCC considers there is a strong case for facilitating the transformation process, 
and for giving irrigators the choice to transform. 
                                                 
131  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 9; Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, 
p. 8. 
132  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 6. 
133  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 2. 
134  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 2. 
135  Central Irrigation Trust, submission 10, pp. 3–4. 
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5.2 Terms, conditions and processes 
5.2.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Currently, most operators do not have a process for transforming entitlements 
separately from trade. Murray Irrigation Limited noted that individuals wishing to 
transform their water entitlements can only do so through trade.136  
The Australian Bankers’ Association submitted that it is not aware of any operator 
allowing transformation separate to trade, and that this process should be explicit.137 
The Australian Bankers’ Association also suggested that it would be more effective if 
governments were to facilitate a one-off transformation for all and ensured that any 
adverse consequences for operators were addressed.138 However, as noted by Murray 
Irrigation Limited, s.  97(6)(b) of the Act permits operators to require approval from 
persons holding a legal or equitable interest in an irrigation right before allowing the 
transformation to proceed. This includes a requirement that irrigators consent to their 
individual right being transformed.139  
The Ricegrowers Association of Australia submitted that operators should not require 
irrigators who import water into the district to un-transform that water back into the 
operator’s group entitlements.140  
5.2.2 Preliminary position 
Some current practices by operators are preventing or unreasonably delaying 
transformation of an irrigator’s entitlement.  
Operators should be required to develop a process for transforming entitlements 
separate to trade and develop standard terms and conditions for transformation, 
including standard forms as identified in chapter 3 and 4. 
Irrigators should not be required to add imported water back into their operator’s group 
entitlement. However, the ACCC notes that an irrigator is free to negotiate the ‘re-
transformation’ of a separately held water access entitlement back into the scheme 
entitlement should they wish. 
                                                 
136  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 33. 
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water access entitlement back into the scheme entitlement.  
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5.3 Right to delivery following transformation 
5.3.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
The Minerals Council of Australia submitted that upon transformation, the parties 
should negotiate the terms and conditions for delivery.141  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation allows members to transform their water right to a water 
access entitlement.142 After transformation, access to the supply network is through a 
separate customer supply contract that specifies terms and conditions of delivery 
services. These terms and conditions are negotiated between the operator and customer. 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation submitted that operators should be allowed to negotiate 
different terms and conditions with transformed customers as compared to non-
transformed customers. Murrumbidgee Irrigation also submitted that: 
subsequent rights to variations by the operator – including circumstances that may 
trigger variation, review provisions, timing, and processes – should be dealt within the 
contract.143 
The Australian Bankers’ Association recommended that transformation should be 
separate to delivery entitlements and capacity share.144  
The New South Wales Irrigators’ Council noted that conditions of transformation 
should not disadvantage the operator’s capacity to seek payment for services 
provided.145  
5.3.2 Preliminary position 
The issues paper noted that explicit delivery contracts are already used by some 
operators for irrigators who hold water access entitlements.  
In instances where an irrigator’s irrigation right has yet to be unbundled, the irrigation 
right to be transformed includes a water entitlement and also a residual right to 
delivery. This right to delivery must be recognised by operators in order for 
transformation arrangements to be successful. Accordingly, the rules should provide 
that existing irrigators have a right to delivery with their operator following 
transformation.  
Operators will need to establish terms and conditions of these separate delivery 
contracts where they do not already exist. Even where separate delivery contracts are in 
use, the parties may wish to negotiate new terms and conditions of supply following 
transformation. The ACCC is concerned that under these circumstances the relative 
bargaining positions of the parties will provide operators with the opportunity to 
                                                 
141  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 9. 
142  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
143  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 7. 
144  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 6 
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impose significantly adverse or harsh conditions on irrigators that have transformed 
their irrigation right.  
Irrigators should not be worse off under a new delivery contract simply because they 
chose to transform their irrigation rights. As such, the terms and conditions of new 
delivery contracts should be substantially equivalent to the terms and conditions 
attached to delivery services provided under the previous supply contract governing the 
irrigation right.  
However, the parties are free to negotiate different contract outcomes. For example, an 
irrigator may wish to pay less for delivery services in exchange for receiving an off-
peak-type service. Alternatively, irrigators who transform their water access entitlement 
may wish to have continued access to benefits from membership of a scheme run by an 
operator. These may include the operator:  
 completing mandatory state and federal reporting requirements as part of the 
licence conditions 
 performing contract negotiations on behalf of members for services such as produce 
packaging. 
The proposed approach allows irrigators to negotiate terms and conditions addressing 
these additional benefits while still providing a safety net to protect irrigator delivery 
interests.  
This condition should be self-regulating and should act as a guide to determining what 
terms and conditions of a new delivery contract are acceptable under the water market 
rules. Irrigators will be able to lodge a complaint with the ACCC and if an operator 
breaches the water market rules, they may be exposed to civil penalty provisions under 
the Act.  
Where an operator’s standard delivery contract is not available or when negotiation of a 
new delivery contract is required, the operator must use their best endeavours to 
negotiate a new contract within 30 days of the transformation being completed.146 
During this time, the operator must provide delivery services in accordance with the 
terms and condition of delivery services in the previous supply contract governing the 
irrigation right. 
                                                 
146  As discussed in chapter 4, a transformation is completed once the operator’s register has been 
updated. 
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An operator must provide delivery arrangements for a transformed water entitlement if 
required by an irrigator.  
Upon transformation, terms and conditions of a delivery contract may reflect those 
contained in the arrangements as they previously related to the irrigation right. 
Alternatively, if a delivery contract is re-negotiated, this must be done so in good faith 
between an operator and the irrigator with a transformed water entitlement. 
Unless otherwise negotiated, the terms and conditions of new delivery contracts should be 
substantially equivalent to those terms and conditions attached to delivery services provided 
under the previous supply contract governing the irrigation right.  
In circumstances where an operator’s standard delivery contract is not available or when 
negotiation of a new delivery contract is required, the operator must use their best 
endeavours to negotiate a new contract within 30 days of the transformation being 
completed. 
During the time of negotiation, the operator must provide delivery services in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of delivery services under the previous supply contract 
governing the irrigation right. 
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6. Restrictive provisions  
Currently, a range of conditions are imposed by operators that prevent or unreasonably 
delay transformation and/or trade. These restrictive provisions may be contained in the 
operators’ supply agreements with irrigators or the terms and conditions for 
transformation and/or trade, or they may not be documented. Any restriction imposed 
by operators is likely to reduce trade and may lead to inefficient market outcomes. 
However, in some cases these restrictions might be imposed for reasons consistent with 
the water market and the trading objectives of the Act. 
This chapter first considers the inclusion in the market rules of a general prohibition on 
all restrictive provisions imposed by operators.  
It then considers the following known restrictive provisions imposed by operators and 
the extent to which these should be permitted under the water market rules: 
 fees and charges imposed on transformation and/or trade 
 restrictions based on the identity of the water purchaser 
 restrictions relating to state legislative requirements 
 restrictions relating to delivery management 
 restrictions relating to conveyance losses 
 metering requirements 
 4 per cent limits on outward trade 
 cut-off dates and trading seasons. 
6.1 A general prohibition on restrictive provisions 
6.1.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
A number of submissions suggested that operators have created restrictions or placed 
outright bans on trade. Around a quarter of submissions, notably those from non-
operators, supported removing restrictions to trade.  
The Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia stated that outright bans and major 
restrictions on permanent and annual trade are common. It provided the example of one 
operator who requires a full member meeting to approve an annual trade.147  
Waterexchange noted that operators: 
routinely manipulate restrictions for any purpose and [this] is ultimately used to 
achieve political or commercial outcomes in order to control the asset 
movement.148  
                                                 
147  Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 5. 
148  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 4. 
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Several submissions supported the removal of an operator’s ability to create restrictions 
on transformation and/or trade. The Minerals Council of Australia submitted that it was 
not appropriate for operators to determine to whom water should be sold.149 Macquarie 
Food and Fibre considered that the only grounds an operator would have for restricting 
trade are where there are physical or capacity-based limitations or known 
environmental externalities.150  
The Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority argued that there should be no 
restriction on who may buy water entitlements. It considered that any restrictions 
should be as limited as possible to fully realise the economic benefits of water 
trading.151 
The South Australian Farmers Federation submitted that ‘protecting irrigation 
infrastructure should not be the principal basis for constraining trade out of areas.’152  
The Australian Bankers’ Association submitted that where operators are able to set 
restrictions, there is also the potential for inconsistencies and uncertainty to develop 
across districts and jurisdictions, which complicates the market. 153  
Approximately two-thirds of submissions raised concerns about potential adverse 
socioeconomic effects on water trade of such restrictions.154 These include attempts by 
operators: 
 to preserve the viability of their own irrigation infrastructure business155  
 to avoid increases in costs for irrigators remaining in the system156  
 to prevent the reduction in value of land and infrastructure in the district157 
 to conserve current population levels and maintain local demand for goods 
complementary to irrigated agriculture158 and for other unrelated goods and services 
such as schools and hospitals.159  
                                                 
149  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 6. 
150  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 11. 
151  Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, submission 15, p. 4. 
152  South Australian Farmers’ Federation, submission 42, p. 4. 
153  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 2. 
154  Peter Murray, submission 49, p. 2; Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 2; West 
Corurgan Board of Management, submission 50, p. 2; Murray Valley Community Action Group, 
submission 9, p. 3; Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, pp. 1–2; . 
155  Sinclair Knight Mertz, submission 28, p. 2; Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, submission 
15, p. 3; Renmark Irrigation Trust, submission 47, p. 1.  
156  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, pp. 1–2; Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, 
submission 15, p. 4; Macquarie Valley Tenandra and Buddah Lakes Scheme, submissions 18 and19, 
p. 1; Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 2; West Corurgan Board of Management, 
submission 50, p. 2; Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, pp. 1–2, Sunraysia Citrus 
Growers, submission 17, p. 1. 
157  Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 2; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, 
p. 21; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 1. 
158  Peter Murray, submission 49, p. 2; Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 6; Mourquong Co-operative, 
submission 14, p. 1; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 1. 
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Central Irrigation Trust suggested a solution was to seek the consent of other members 
before approving external trades.160 Other submissions suggested maintaining a 
percentage limit on permanent exports, similar to the current 4 per cent limit, to slow 
down adjustment.161  
Conversely, the Australian Conservation Foundation submitted that any percentage or 
proportional caps on water entitlements that can be held by non-irrigators or local 
landholders were inappropriate barriers to trade.162 
6.1.2 Preliminary position 
Currently, operators have the ability to set rules and procedures that restrict or prevent 
transformation and trade.  
The ability of operators to set the rules creates the potential for conflict between the 
interests of the operator and those of potential buyers and sellers.  
Even in cases where operators are run in an open, democratic way with an elected 
board representing member irrigators, there is the potential for conflict between a seller 
and remaining members acting collectively.  
Submissions expressed concerns about inadequate mechanisms to protect third parties, 
and the potential socioeconomic effects of water trade. However, there are alternative 
policy instruments available to policy-makers (e.g. the federal and jurisdictional 
governments) that make them better placed to address these issues rather than 
operators.  
The explanatory memorandum to the Water Bill 2007 states that the purpose of the 
water market rules is to: 
free up the trade of water access rights within the Murray-Darling Basin by ensuring 
that the policies or administrative requirements of [irrigation] infrastructure operators 
do not represent a barrier to trade.163  
Consistent with this objective, the market rules should allow operators only the 
minimum restrictions necessary to enable efficient trade. To achieve this, the ACCC 
considers a general prohibition is reasonable and necessary.  
                                                                                                                                              
159  Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 2; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 1; 
Vin Byrnes, submission 6, p. 1; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 1. 
160  Central Irrigation Trust, submission 10, p. 2. 
161  Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 3; Renmark Irrigation Trust, submission 47, p. 1. 
Renmark Irrigation Trust suggested a limit on large exports (e.g. one trade of more than 20 per cent 
of the total volume of water delivered by the trust). 
162  Australian Conservation Foundation, submission 23, p. 8. 
163  Explanatory memorandum to the Water Bill 2007, clause 97, paragraph 190, p. 28. 
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However, operator-imposed restrictions are required in some cases. The water market 
rules should explicitly permit these restrictions.  
6.2 Fees and charges 
6.2.1 Preliminary position 
Any fee levied by an operator on the transfer of a water entitlement will act as a barrier 
to the trade of water from relatively lower to higher value uses. The imposition of these 
fees results in an inefficient allocation of water between competing users and 
consequently a loss of economic welfare, since the full potential gains from trade are 
not realised. The welfare loss increases at an increasing rate as fees become larger 
relative to the traded price of water.  
However, an operator may be warranted in levying administrative fees and charges 
associated with processing the transformation and trade of a water entitlement for 
reasons discussed in section 4.3. Similarly the Act states that the water market rules 
must not prevent an operator from imposing, or requiring payment of, a regulated water 
charge.164 These forms of fees and charges should be considered to be exemptions.  
 
                                                 
164  Water Act, s. 97(6)(a). Regulated water charge is defined in s. 91 of the Act. 
Subject to limited explicit exceptions, provided for in the water market rules, an operator 
should not be permitted to impose any restrictions in contracts, arrangements or 
understandings. Examples of restrictions that would be prohibited include (but are not 
limited to): 
 some fees and charges levied on the transformation and/or trade of a water access 
entitlement 
 restrictions based on the identity of the water purchaser 
 cut-off dates and trading seasons. 
Operators should not be permitted to levy any fee or charge on the transformation and/or 
trade of a water access entitlement except where the fee: 
 Is an administrative fee or charge for processing a transformation and/or trade, 
calculated in accordance with the water market rules, or  
 is a regulated water charge as defined in the Act. 
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6.3 Restrictions based on the identity of the water purchaser 
6.3.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Market manipulation 
Currently, operators can restrict the type of person who can buy water entitlements—
for example, by requiring the purchaser to be a landholder in the district.165  
Water for Rivers considered that there was no case for this kind of restriction, 
contending that it did not reflect a jurisdictional requirement and made recovery of 
water for environmental purposes slower and more expensive.166 The Queensland Bulk 
Water Supply Authority supported this position:  
[R]estrictions on trade should be as limited as possible. The purpose of water markets is 
to allow water to be traded to its highest value use, enhancing overall economic welfare 
through making the best possible use of a scarce resource. Operator approval of the use to 
which traded water is put may interfere with this process.167 
The Australian Bankers’ Association recommended that individual operators should not 
set their own rules concerning ownership of water entitlement other than those made to 
implement government policy. The association argued that any potential for 
inconsistency in setting rules can significantly complicate the market.168 
A number of submissions supported restrictions that would prevent non-landholders 
purchasing water because of the potential for speculators to enter the water market, 
hoard large quantities of water and manipulate the market price.169 The term ‘water 
barons’ featured extensively in submissions.170  
Mourquong Co-operative, an operator in New South Wales, submitted that large 
companies could accumulate water licences and then push the price of water up by 
restricting the timing of seasonal water placed on the market.171 It advocated restrictions 
that water be traded within tight geographical zones and to genuine farmers or water 
users only.172 This wording was mirrored by Sunraysia Citrus Growers.173 
                                                 
165  Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 3. 
166  Water for Rivers, submission 51, p. 3. 
167  Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, submission 15, p. 4. 
168  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, pp. 1-2. 
169  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 7; Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 4; Mourquong 
Co-operative, submission 14, pp. 1-2; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 1; United Dairy 
Farmers of Victoria, submission 29, p. 5; Victorian Farmers’ Federation, submission 54, p. 6; 
Vin Byrnes, submission 6, p. 1. 
170  Victorian Farmers’ Federation, submission 54, p. 6; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 1; 
Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 1; United Dairy Farmers of Victoria, submission 29, 
p. 5. 
171  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 1. 
172  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, pp. 1–2. 
173  Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 1.  
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The Bondi Group submitted that water purchasers should be prevented from 
withholding water or from selling water back ‘at an unreasonable rate.’174 It supported 
trade to non-landholders where a termination fee was paid on surrendered delivery 
entitlements, as a way to prevent ‘outside corporations buying water and selling it back 
at inflated prices.’175  
Western Murray Irrigation submitted that, despite over 20 per cent of its bulk licence 
being owned by non-landholders and non-irrigators, it found no evidence that water 
was currently being hoarded or manipulated in its district, as water was transferred 
annually to related party farms at no charge.176  
Both Western Murray Irrigation and Murray Irrigation Limited submitted that they do 
not allow non-landholders to hold delivery entitlements. Western Murray Irrigation 
requires termination of delivery entitlement and payment of termination fees if water is 
to be permanently traded to an environmental water purchaser or non-landholder.177  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation submitted that existing laws should be sufficient to address 
speculative or predatory behaviour in water markets.178 
Two submissions noted that the average return on water investment is in the range of 
3 to 5 per cent and therefore is not an attractive investment, so there is no reason to 
exclude investors from the market.179 Waterexchange submitted that investors may add 
extra liquidity to flat markets. 180 
Government environmental water purchases 
Several submissions were critical of the policy and process relating to government 
environmental water purchases.181 These submissions supported restrictions that 
prevented non-landholders purchasing water, to prevent the government from making 
purchases.  
The Victorian Farmers Federation submitted that the rules should prevent distortions in 
the market arising from the government entering the market to secure additional water 
for the environment or to buyback over-allocated water.182  
Conversely, the Australian Conservation Foundation contended that the environment is 
a key user of water and therefore must be able to stand in the market on the same 
footing as other water users. It argued there was no basis for excluding or restricting 
                                                 
174  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 8. 
175  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 7. 
176  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 19. 
177  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 18. 
178  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 3. 
179  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 2; Australian Water Brokers’ Association, submission 24, p. 6. 
180  Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 2. 
181  Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 2; Victorian Farmers’ Federation, submission 54, 
p. 3.  
182  Victorian Farmers’ Federation, submission 54, p. 3. 
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participation by agents representing the environment in the water market. Such 
restrictions hinder efforts to address key policy and market failure issues.183  
Offering for internal trade 
Some operators require that water entitlements should first be offered for sale 
internally.184 This includes water savings stemming from installation of more efficient 
irrigation infrastructure.185 Waterexchange did not support these restrictions, stating that 
they were ‘used as a handbrake to blunt and control water trading’.186 
Reciprocal arrangements 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation argued that it should be permitted to restrict trade into other 
districts when reciprocal arrangements for trade are not fair and reasonable as a way of 
influencing the behaviour of other operators. It submitted that this is ‘a last resort in 
terms of ensuring a level playing field for its stakeholders and to date has not been 
applied.’187  
6.3.2 Preliminary position 
Operators place restrictions on the type of person who can buy water entitlements; for 
example, some operators require the purchaser to be a landholder in the district or to be 
in the business of irrigated agriculture.  
Constraints on the parties to whom water can be sold would not prevent speculation by 
current landholders or potential traders in future. To the extent that trade in some water 
markets appears to be thin and therefore potentially more prone to participants wielding 
market power, this may be exacerbated by restrictions and prohibitions on trading. 
There is little evidence that any parties could profitably ‘hoard’ water entitlements. 
Submissions suggest the return from capital investment in water entitlements is low and 
only generated when the water is used. In addition, water is difficult and expensive to 
store for any extended period. While there is likely to be long-term capital growth in 
the value of water entitlements because of climate change and increasing scarcity of 
water, the full value of water is best realised from its use as a business input.  
On the contrary: entry of non-water users is likely to facilitate trade. New entrants may 
inject capital and develop new products that allow irrigators to adopt different risk and 
financing strategies than are currently available. Also, the Trade Practices Act 1974 
provides a level of protection against anti-competitive conduct. 
                                                 
183  Australian Conservation Foundation, submission 23, p. 14. 
184  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 9; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44; p. 4. 
185  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 4. 
186  Waterexchange Australia, submission 46, p. 3. 
187  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, pp. 4. 
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A range of stakeholders expressed concerns about the government’s environmental 
water tenders. These include transparency, accountability and lack of analysis on the 
socioeconomic impact of purchases. However, the water market rules are not the 
appropriate mechanism for addressing these concerns. 
Operators’ restrictions requiring water to be first offered for internal trade should not be 
permitted. This type of restriction unnecessarily thins the market and prevents gains 
from trade being realised.  
Similarly, operators should not be allowed to place restrictions on trade when dealing 
with unfamiliar intermediaries or operators. While there is potential for increased 
compliance costs in these situations, this is considered to be a transitional issue. 
Similarly, restrictions preventing dealings with other operators because of a lack of 
reciprocal arrangements should not be permitted. There should be no need for this type 
of remedial action once the water market rules come into effect. 
6.4 Restrictions relating to state legislative requirements 
6.4.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Several submissions received discussed trading restrictions imposed by state 
governments (as opposed to those imposed by operators). These restrictions cannot be 
considered through the water market rules as defined under the Act. 
However, a number of operators submitted that restrictions are required to comply with 
state legislative requirements and that these should be permissible under the water 
market rules.188  
Some operators hold their bulk entitlements under licences in state legislation and 
regulation. These licences contain conditions with which operators must comply or face 
civil penalties. One submission noted that operators had state-based requirements 
imposed on it under irrigation and drainage management plans.189 
Beyond the explicit restrictions in state legislation, some stakeholders noted that there 
is the potential for operators to misinterpret or misapply legislation and policies as a 
basis for creating and justifying their own restrictions. 
For example, both Water for Rivers and the Bondi Group noted that in Victoria, the 
4 per cent cap on external permanent trade is applied separately over each zone in the 
Goulburn-Murray River area by operators.190 Water for Rivers submitted that Goulburn 
                                                 
188  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 23; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 4. 
189  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 18. 
190  Water for Rivers, submission 45, p. 1; Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 4. 
Operators should not be permitted to impose any restrictions based on the identity of the 
water purchasers on the transformation and/or trade of a water access entitlement. 
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Murray Water applied the 4 per cent cap in each of its six separate zones rather than 
over the whole bulk entitlement, while in New South Wales the 4 per cent cap is 
applied to the whole of the bulk entitlement of the irrigation corporations.191  
For the most part submissions did not identify explicit restrictions on transformation 
and/or trade applied by operators to comply with state legislation. However, restrictions 
relating to the following requirements may be imposed for this purpose. 
Minimum requirements for stock & domestic use 
Some New South Wales operators submitted that they had an obligation to deliver 
water to stock and domestic customers.192 No evidence was submitted that these 
obligations stemmed from state legislation.  
Western Murray Irrigation considered that domestic household supplies should be 
protected through its ‘stock and garden entitlements’ being non-tradeable rights that are 
kept with a dwelling.193  
Murray Irrigation Limited noted that it currently requires five water entitlements to be 
retained per landholding for domestic and stock purposes as a condition of trade. It 
considers it has an obligation to provide a basic service to landholders and that it is not 
practical to limit access by stock to unfenced channels crossing or adjoining private 
land.194 
Moira Private Irrigation District considered it appropriate to allow smaller operators to 
retain a minimum water holding in the form of a minimum percentage of the 
entitlement previously associated with the landholding or as a minimum quantity for 
stock and domestic purposes. This was seen as justified on the basis of protecting third-
party interests, particularly in relation to escalating costs for remaining irrigators and 
the protection of land values in the area.195 
Environmental regulation 
Several submissions argued that some kind of constraint on trade should exist to limit 
impacts on the environment.196 Stakeholders submitted that trade should be restricted 
when: 
 there is no proof that the water use will be sustainable 197  
 there are physical or capacity-based limitations and known environmental 
externalities 198 
                                                 
191  Water for Rivers, submission 45, p. 1. 
192  Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 2; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, 
p. 19; Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 11. 
193  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 19. 
194  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 11. 
195  Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 4. 
196  Goulburn Broken Catchment Management Authority, submission 12, p. 1; Australian Conservation 
Foundation, submission 23, p. 8. 
197  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 18. 
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 there is a need for minimum water holdings to account for environmental impacts 
such as salinity 199 
 there is potential for impact on an environmental issue of national significance200  
 there are sleeper or dozer allocations.201 
Conversely, a number of stakeholders submitted that restrictions on the basis of 
possible use of water are more efficiently executed by requiring separate use approval, 
as set out in clause 30 of the NWI202 or under statutory water allocation plans, rather 
than by tying this to trade. 203  
Several stakeholders submitted that operators should only facilitate the physical 
movement of water to customers in response to trade204 as the time and cost of gaining 
approval of land and water management plans can be considerable and can affect 
trade.205  
Whether any of these restrictions are, or should be, applied by operators was not often 
specified in submissions. While not expressly noted, it would appear operators may 
have some responsibilities to monitor and manage water use within their districts. This 
appears to be in order to limit environmental effects associated with water use, to be 
consistent with conditions contained in their licences and land and water management 
plans. 
Murray Irrigation Limited submitted that moving responsibility for implementing 
environmental policies from operators (through their operating licences) to individual 
irrigators would:  
require more extensive monitoring of the activities of every individual irrigator and an 
administrative mechanism for attributing the costs to particular causers, possibly through 
individual pricing.206  
                                                                                                                                              
198  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 11; Australian Conservation Foundation, 
submission 23, p. 8. 
199  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 9. 
200  Sinclair Knight Mertz, submission 28, p. 3 
201  Australian Conservation Foundation, submission 23, p. 15. Sleeper or dozer allocations are those 
that are held but currently not actively used by the holder. Therefore, they are not currently taken 
into account in water planning and management activities and water use approvals.  
202  Clause 30 of the NWI provides that regulatory approvals enabling water use at a particular site for a 
particular purpose should be specified separately to the water access entitlement, consistent with the 
principles set out in Schedule D of the NWI. 
203  Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, submission 15, p. 3; National Farmers’ Federation, 
submission 41, p. 5; South Australian Farmers’ Federation, submission 42, p. 3. SunWater, 
submission 21, p. 3; Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 5; Minerals Council 
of Australia, submission 39, p. 5.  
204 Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 5. 
205  Queensland Farmers’ Federation and Queensland Irrigators’ Council, submission 58, pp. 4–5. 
206  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 24. 
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Category of the entitlement 
Murray Irrigation Limited noted that the Act is silent on the characteristics attributed to 
transformed entitlements. However, it considers it reasonable to assume that the 
transformed water entitlement would be subject to the conditions that attach to the 
operator’s bulk water access entitlement (e.g. supply security or relevant reliability 
conversion rules).207  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation submitted that any restriction relating to trade and/or 
transformation placed by the state on specific types of water rights should be 
permissible.208 Murrumbidgee Irrigation also supported restrictions on trade out of a 
specific districts or defined zones ‘when such trade cannot be accommodated because 
of special hydrological and water supply conditions’. Murrumbidgee cited the 
Wah Wah irrigation area as an example, noting it is supplied by drainage water. 209  
6.4.2 Preliminary position 
It would appear that state government-imposed restrictions on trade can still be applied 
without needing to be replicated by operators. Where operators introduce restrictions 
that inappropriately rely on or refer to state government requirements, there is the 
potential for these requirements to be misinterpreted and applied to members 
improperly. 
Minimum requirements for stock and domestic use 
As noted above, some operators require a minimum irrigation right to be retained by all 
members, ostensibly to provide for potential stock and domestic requirements. Some of 
these restrictions may stem from clear community service obligations under relevant 
state legislation. If the obligation is contained in state legislation, a specific exception 
to the water market rules general prohibition on restrictions would be warranted.  
However, it is possible that operators will use this exception to prevent irrigators from 
disconnecting supply and exiting the industry.  
One justification might be to protect future purchasers from inadvertently buying ‘dry’ 
land. In such cases, the purchaser may be liable for reconnection fees, which might be 
significant if that particular branch of the network has been dormant. However, this 
problem should become evident through the inquiries of a responsible purchaser before 
the purchase of any land. The need for this additional protection appears unwarranted.  
                                                 
207  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 2. 
208  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p.  4. 
209  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 4. 
Operators should only be permitted to require a minimum irrigation right to be maintained 
on the transformation and/or trade where this is a requirement of a community service 
obligation contained in a state legislative instrument.
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Environmental regulation 
Linking water use approvals with the transformation and/or trade of water entitlements 
may not be the most appropriate mechanism for dealing with concerns about the effects 
of water use on the environment. While such restrictions might mitigate the 
environmental impact of water use, they would do so in an inconsistent way.  
Restrictions on use are fundamentally tied to specific land. The seller’s operator should 
not control who buys the seller’s water entitlements or how the sold water is used. The 
ACCC notes that restrictions relating to use, which may be necessary to comply with 
licence conditions, can still be applied to landholders and irrigation right-holders who 
have not transformed.  
Operators should not be permitted to impose restrictions on transformation or trade of a 
transformed water access entitlement in an attempt to regulate land use and the 
environmental effects of water use.  
Category of the entitlement 
The ACCC assumes that upon transformation a newly created water access entitlement 
would be subject to the same state-imposed conditions attaching to the operator’s 
‘group’ water access entitlement. As noted previously, it would appear that any state 
government trading restrictions (previously associated with the operator’s entitlement) 
would apply to the irrigators transformed water access entitlement. Therefore, an 
operator does not need to replicate these requirements.  
It is understood that operators may have defined categories of irrigation rights (possibly 
related to use, security and/or location within the network) in their supply agreements, 
to manage district specific issues. It is unknown whether these replicate state water 
access entitlement categories defined in legislation.  
Without further information on why the existing state water rights regimes are 
insufficient to manage district specific issue, operators should not be permitted to 
impose such restrictions. The ACCC invites stakeholders to provide further information 
to better inform this judgement. 
6.5 Delivery management  
6.5.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
The Minerals Council of Australia argued that operators may have to temporarily 
decline or postpone a trade when water cannot physically be delivered to all customers 
at the same time. It suggested that operators are in the best position to plan delivery 
Operators should not be permitted to impose restrictions on transformation or trade of a 
transformed water access entitlement relating to regulating land use and environmental 
effects of water use.  
Operators should not be permitted to impose restrictions on transformation or trade of a 
transformed water access entitlement relating to the category of the entitlement.  
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timetables because they have the best information about overall water flows and 
infrastructure capacities at any point in time.210 
6.5.2 Preliminary position 
Trades may be inhibited by congestion and the physical constraints of irrigation 
infrastructure. However, this is only a concern for operators where it relates to trades 
into the network (‘imports’) or where it relates to trades within the operator’s network 
(‘internal’ trades). The ACCC notes that restrictions relating to the physical constraints 
of the irrigation infrastructure can still be applied to irrigation right-holders who have 
not transformed. Further, any physical constraints are addressed through water delivery 
rights.  
6.6  Conveyance losses 
6.6.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
The Minerals Council of Australia identified that if a base load of water is required to 
operate the infrastructure, this should be delineated in the relevant water sharing plan.211  
Submissions noted that several irrigation schemes, particularly those in northern New 
South Wales, were designed around an assumption of socialised transmission losses.212 
This means that irrigators accept that part of their water entitlement would be lost 
because of evaporation and seepage while in transit to their properties. On export, a 
proportion is claimed by the operator to cover losses down the channel213, and operators 
in these schemes do not currently hold separate water entitlements specifically to cover 
these transmission losses.  
There is the potential for operators to use this conversion calculation inappropriately to 
discourage export and dampen trade:  
Every water entitlement is one mega litre at the Mulwala Take Off on the Murray River 
but when the farmer goes to sell his water back to the river, for the environment, MIL 
claims 17% is theirs. Farmers all accept there is a loss down the channel to their farms 
but where is this water going when it is put back in the river before the Take Off. 214  
                                                 
210  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, pp. 5–6. 
211  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 5. 
212  For example, the Tenandra, Buddah Lakes and Greenhide schemes in the Macquarie Valley. See 
Macquarie Valley, Tenandra and Buddah Lakes schemes, submissions 18 and 19, p. 1.  
213  Thomas McCallum, submission 4, p. 2. 
214  Thomas McCallum, submission 4, p. 2. 
Operators should not be permitted to impose restrictions on transformation and/or trade of a 
transformed entitlement to manage delivery and the physical constraints of the irrigation 
infrastructure except where the transformed water entitlement is sold within the district. 
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It was submitted that evaporations losses are relatively steady regardless of the number 
of members in the system. Therefore, when members exit these systems, the remaining 
members share the burden of these losses among a smaller number of irrigators.215  
The Moira Private Irrigator District noted that where a proposed export would reduce 
demand on a particular channel below the level that justifies maintenance of that 
channel system, three options would be available to an operator:  
 to prevent the proposed export  
 to decommission the channel entirely and stop supplying remaining members 
(forcing the permanent export of any remaining water entitlements and closure of 
water-reliant businesses) 
 to spread the fixed cost of maintaining the channel across the remaining members.216  
Namoi Water noted that town water is provided for by operators in some areas, and 
decommissioning the channel system would not be an option in those cases. It 
suggested that operators should have the power to block particular trades that are 
inherently inefficient because of the smallness of the order and the dryness of the 
particular river system. It noted: 
this is the case within the Namoi and other northern systems now – State Water is not 
obligated to deliver if the orders are small and the system is dry. These decisions are taken 
through consultation and discussion with users.217 
Murray Irrigation Ltd mentioned that districts may have specific hydrological 
characteristics that are best dealt with by operator restrictions.218 
Moira Private Irrigator District suggested that all irrigation schemes will need to 
undergo a review of their operational needs to determine what the minimum operating 
requirements actually are.219 It was not specified whether this assessment would need to 
be done at each trade, as a once-off or on a regular annual or semiannual basis.  
An alternative to the system of socialised transmission losses is the operator owning 
sufficient water entitlements in its own right to cover evaporation and minimum 
operating requirements.220 SunWater submitted that the risk of distribution losses 
should be held by operators (as occurs in Queensland) and not borne by water users. 
Operators would be free to trade these entitlements, at their own risk, subject to the 
maintenance of service levels within the irrigation system.221  
                                                 
215  Macquarie Valley, Tenandra and Buddah Lakes schemes, submissions 18 and 19, p. 1. 
216  Moira Private Irrigator District, submission 52, p. 5. 
217  Namoi Water, submission 27, p. 1. 
218  For example, in the Wah Wah irrigation area, drainage water cannot physically be returned to the 
primary water source. See Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 4. 
219  Moira Private Irrigator District, submission 52, p. 6. 
220  SunWater, submission 21, p. 3. 
221  SunWater, submission 21, p. 3. 
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6.6.2 Preliminary position 
Submissions pointed to restrictions imposed by operators, where, as a condition of 
trade, they withhold a portion of the seller’s irrigation rights out of the network to cover 
future conveyance losses.  
Conveyance (or distribution) losses relate to the water lost in the operator’s network 
through evaporation, seepage etc. These losses represent the difference between the 
volume of water that needs to be diverted, by an operator (from the water source) for 
distribution to customers and the volume of water actually delivered by the operator to 
customers.  
Conveyance losses often comprise a fixed component associated with the volume of 
water required to commence delivery of water, and a variable component that increases 
as water delivery volumes increase. These losses are understood to be most significant 
in gravity irrigation districts that use open channels for water delivery, and less 
significant in piped distribution systems.  
The portion of fixed conveyance losses will also depend on the extent of the operator’s 
network. Where customers are dispersed throughout the network, the conveyance 
losses will be far higher than when they are concentrated.  
Where possible, operators should hold water entitlements to cover fixed conveyance 
losses. Operators are in a position to upgrade common infrastructure and benefit from 
the resulting drop in evaporation and increased water savings. Where operators hold a 
water entitlement to cover fixed conveyance losses, this arrangement provides 
operators with the incentive to perform these upgrades and realise these savings. 
Currently, some operators in New South Wales hold a separate ‘conveyance’ licence to 
cover the losses associated with delivering water through their network. However, it is 
understood that operators in South Australia and many operators in New South Wales 
do not have these separate entitlements.  
Where operators do not hold entitlements to cover conveyance losses, these losses may 
be socialised across irrigators in a district. In this case, trade out of a district may result 
in the fixed losses associated with operating the network being borne by fewer 
remaining irrigators, so that they experience an increase in the average fixed 
conveyance losses.  
However, the effects on these third parties do not have implications for economic 
efficiency. It is noted that operators with separately held conveyance entitlements 
would be insulated from the effect of a prohibition on restrictions of these forms. 
 
Operators must not restrict the transformation and/or trade of a portion of an irrigator’s 
entitlement for the purposes of covering conveyance losses. 
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6.7 Metering 
6.7.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Stakeholders that commented on metering all supported requiring an irrigator to be 
metered before allowing that irrigator to trade.222 Some submissions noted that metering 
provides data to support efficiency improvements, enables monitoring and detection of 
theft and provides more accurate accounting for water.223  
One irrigator suggested that transitional arrangements may be needed to assist with the 
cost of installing meters.224 It was noted that metering is already a requirement for water 
licence holders in South Australia.225 Another operator noted that it supports metering, 
but allows irrigators to trade out an unmetered entitlement if the supply outlet is closed 
to the satisfaction of the operator.226  
6.7.2 Preliminary position 
The ACCC supports restrictions that prevent trade where there is no meter on the 
relevant property if the seller does not intend to sell all their water entitlement and 
disconnect from the operator’s infrastructure. In this scenario, a meter is not required 
going forward and a requirement for metering would create an unnecessarily cost and 
deter structural adjustment.  
Further, operators should be allowed to require new customers to install a meter as part 
of the new supply contract and/or before connecting the land to its irrigation 
infrastructure.  
6.8 The 4 per cent limit on trade out of a district 
The NWI established an interim threshold limit on the level of permanent trade out of 
all water irrigation areas of 4 per cent per annum of the total water access entitlement 
for the water irrigation area, subject to review.227 
                                                 
222  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 5; Rod Leavold, submission 48, p. 4; 
Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 2; Vin Byrnes, submission 6, p. 1; Western 
Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 21; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 4. 
223  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 7. 
224  Rod Leavold, submission 48, p. 4. 
225  South Australian Farmers’ Federation, submission 42, p. 4. 
226  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 4. 
227  Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, paragraph 63. 
Operators should be permitted to prevent transformation and/or trade until supply is metered 
except where the irrigator is terminating access to the operator’s infrastructure.  
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Several submissions supported the maintenance of the 4 per cent limit on permanent 
trade out of an irrigation district. 228 At its meeting on 3 July 2008 COAG stated its 
ambition to increase the cap on the trade of water entitlements out of districts from four 
to six per cent. The water market rules should accommodate the outcomes of this 
agreement. 
6.9 Cut-off dates and trading seasons 
An operator’s imposition of cut-off dates for completing trades (or submitting trade 
applications) or their definition of ‘trading seasons’ that are shorter than the irrigation 
season could act as barriers to transformation and/or trade.  
6.9.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Numerous stakeholders submitted that cut-off dates and trading seasons are anti-
competitive, disadvantage some irrigators in favour of others and are generally an 
impediment to trade.229  
Conversely, some stakeholders submitted that cut-off dates do not act as a barrier to 
trade and are necessary for operators to effectively manage the operation of their water 
access entitlement. 230 Operators rely on cut-off dates to allow for the balancing of 
accounts by finalising season water use and determining carryover.231  
Some stakeholders recommended that trading windows should be increased to provide 
more flexibility for irrigators, particularly in the case of late season water232, and that 
there should not be any substantive reason to justify cut-off dates for permanent trade 
in water entitlements.233 One stakeholder went further to suggest the use of carryover 
eliminates the need for cut-off dates.234 
                                                 
228  New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, pp. 6–7; Victorian Farmers’ Federation, 
submission 54, pp. 3, 7; United Dairy Farmers of Victoria, submission 29, p. 5. UDFV did not 
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229  Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 3; Australian Water Brokers’ Association, 
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submission 47, p. 1; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 6; Bondi Group, submission 32, 
p. 13.  
231  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 30.  
232  Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 3. 
233  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 30; Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, 
p. 5. 
234  Goulburn Broken Catchment Management Authority, submission 12, p. 1. 
Operators should be permitted to impose a cap on permanent trade out of an irrigation 
district in accordance with any agreement between the federal government and state 
governments as reflected in state legislation.
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Various submissions included information on the current practice of some operators 
and government agencies in relation to cut-off dates. Some operators noted that the 
New South Wales Government determines annual temporary trading cut-off dates to 
accommodate critical water planning.235 Western Murray Irrigation also allows for 
internal trading until late June. However, it has never specified cut-off dates for 
external trades and does not define trading seasons which are different from the New 
South Wales Government directive.236.  
The Ricegrowers’ Association of Australian noted that StateWater in New South Wales 
has closed the season a month earlier for the last couple of years on the basis that it 
gives it more time to do end-of-season adjustments.237 In the case of permanent trade of 
entitlements if undertaken part-way through a season, StateWater only assigns the 
associated allocation to that entitlement at the beginning of the next full irrigation 
season.238  
Murray Irrigation Limited noted operators are often restricted by licence conditions—
for example, the New South Wales Murrumbidgee regulated river water sharing plan 
that includes cut-off dates for both inter-valley and intra-valley trade before the end of 
the irrigation supply season. Murray Irrigation Limited claims these dates act to limit 
use of available water and benefit water users within the irrigation corporations in the 
Murrumbidgee Valley.  
The Winemakers’ Federation of Australia submitted that its members have noted a 
level of confusion about variations in trading ‘windows’ between irrigation districts.239 
While Macquarie River Food and Fibre observed that trading seasons are generally not 
applicable in the Macquarie Valley but noted that some operators may wish to have a 
cut-off date for permanent transfers within the water year.240  
Some stakeholders noted that a key issue regarding cut-off dates and trading seasons is 
that those dates should be predetermined and sufficiently publicised in the industry.241 
Stakeholders also noted that these dates should be consistent across the Murray-Darling 
Basin 242, should be reviewed regularly to account for improvements in efficiency in the 
trading process and should reflect operational constraints.243  
6.9.2 Preliminary position 
There may be legitimate business reasons for operators to implement the use of cut-off 
dates and trading seasons for temporary trades to allow the sufficient processing time 
                                                 
235  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 31; Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 27. 
236  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, pp. 27–28. 
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238  Bondi Group, submission 32, pp. 12. 
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and finalisation of accounts referred to by many stakeholders. However, cut-off dates 
and trading seasons shorter than the state-defined trading season may also be used by 
operators to prohibit or unreasonably delay transformation and/or trade.  
Permanent trade and the process of transformation separate to trade should not be 
restricted through the use of cut-off dates and trading seasons. In particular 
transformation should be permitted irrespective of the trading season as it represents a 
solidifying of an irrigator’s right. The timing of any application to transform should not 
impact on the operator.  
Operators should not be permitted to impose cut-off dates and limit trading seasons for 
transformation and/or trade of a transformed water entitlement.
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7. Security for future payment of fees 
An operator’s requirement for security for future payment of fees before the trade of a 
transformed water access entitlement can prevent or unreasonably delay trade. This 
chapter details the ACCC’s considerations about:: 
 the need for security 
 instances when security should be required of an irrigator  
 the form security should take 
 the value or quantum of security.  
Under the schedule E protocol on access, exit and termination fees244 in the Murray-
Darling Basin Agreement, water rights are to be unbundled from delivery rights, with 
the ongoing fees for access to the operator’s water delivery network applied to the 
delivery right. As a result, irrigators can maintain their delivery right and continue to 
pay ongoing access fees following the sale of their water right.  
In its 2006 exit, access and termination fees report (exit fees report), the ACCC noted 
operators’ concerns that allowing irrigators to elect to maintain their delivery 
entitlements following the sale of their water entitlements could reduce the revenue 
security of an operator in some circumstances.245  
To address this concern, the schedule E protocol allows operators to seek security over 
the future payment of access fees in specific circumstances: 
Before approving the transfer of any water entitlement, an infrastructure operator should not 
require security for the payment of future continuing access fees unless: 
(a)  the current market value of any water entitlements retained by the transferor to water 
within the relevant irrigation district is less than 50 per cent of any termination fee 
which would be payable upon the surrender of all of the delivery entitlements retained; 
and 
(b) the infrastructure operator considers, on reasonable grounds, that there is a significant 
risk that the transferor may be unable to pay future access fees in relation to those 
delivery entitlements, when they fall due.246 
The exit fees report noted that allowing for operators to seek security as a condition of 
approval for trade could represent an unnecessary barrier to trade. The ACCC 
recommended a review of these arrangements to consider whether they unduly restrict 
trade. 
                                                 
244  Murray-Darling Basin Commission, Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, ‘Schedule E protocols on 
access, exit and termination fees’, May 2008. 
245  ACCC, A regime for the calculation and implementation of exit, access and termination fees 
charged by irrigation water delivery businesses in the southern Murray-Darling Basin, November 
2006, p. 53. 
246  Clause 9(1) of the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, ‘Schedule E protocols on access, exit and 
termination fees’, May 2008. 
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7.1 The need for security 
7.1.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Many operators were concerned that irrigators who elect to maintain their delivery 
entitlement following the sale of their water entitlement represent a significant credit 
risk to the operator.247 The submissions argued that credit risk can result in difficulties 
for ongoing investment in water delivery services.248 Some operators submitted that 
there is a risk of stranded assets, in terms of abandoned land left with large liabilities 
and irrigation systems that cannot be maintained by exiting customers.249  
Several stakeholders recommended that operators should be able to require security to 
allow them to manage their risks.250 Further, Murray Irrigation Limited submitted that: 
(the) application of security requirements facilitates the basin water market by providing a 
secure financial base for irrigation operators and certainty for irrigators and other parties 
owning water entitlements.251 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation recognised that ‘security arrangements may lock up capital 
but are consistent with reasonable risk sharing between operators and individual 
members.’252  
Numerous infrastructure stakeholders noted that while they had the ability to 
commence legal action to enforce contractual arrangements and recover debts, the costs 
associated with such legal action may be prohibitive and time-consuming, particularly 
for small operators.253 From a practical perspective, Murray Irrigation Limited noted 
that its members would be unlikely to endorse more ‘aggressive’ debt-recovery action 
such as forced liquidation.254  
Some operators said the probability of recovering outstanding debts in the event of 
insolvency would be low because operators have unsecured creditor status and would 
be ‘placed behind the banks.’255 However, one submission noted that operators should 
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have a similar status to that of all other unsecured creditors without any special security 
rights.256  
Murray Irrigation Limited contended that irrigators who transfer the majority of their 
water entitlements fall into three categories: those who intend to rely on the purchase of 
allocations; those who speculate that the future price of permanent water entitlements 
will be lower and sell with a view to re-purchasing; or those who have commenced an 
exit strategy. Murray Irrigation Limited considers those who intend to exit to be the 
most common.257  
In view of the credit risk, several operators submitted that they should retain the ability 
to manage delivery entitlements and their termination.258 The New South Wales 
Farmers’ Association noted operators are in practice electing to impose compulsory 
termination fees rather than a security.259 This is evidenced by Murray Irrigation 
Limited and Western Murray Irrigation requiring payment of a termination fee on all 
water entitlements transferred from a landholding without delivery entitlements.260  
Various stakeholders suggested that the time of sale of a water entitlement represents a 
good opportunity to recover the costs of termination rather than providing security.261  
Some stakeholders, particularly water brokers and water exchanges, suggested that 
security is only necessary in the short term. They argued that the longer term access by 
market participants to the ‘full suite’ of water products (such as derivatives and 
futures)262 and customer retention through marketing, individual contractual 
negotiations, price discounting and service delivery263 should adequately address 
operator credit risks. 
7.1.2 Preliminary position 
In specific circumstances, operators may face additional credit risks when irrigators 
hold delivery entitlements in the absence of corresponding water access entitlements.264  
Stakeholders also highlighted the costs associated with recovering outstanding fees and 
charges in the event of default. The ACCC acknowledges that normal business 
practices of enforcing bad debts may not be suitable in all situations because of the 
disproportionate legal and administrative costs associated with debt recovery. 
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Operators should be able to mitigate such a risk by seeking security for the future 
payment of access fees. When applied appropriately, the use of security can have a 
beneficial impact on the water market by providing a degree of certainty for all 
participants, particularly operators. 
Some stakeholders suggested that security is only required as a temporary measure and 
that alternate water products will eliminate the need for security in the longer term. The 
ACCC has not fully investigated the effects that alternative water products, such as 
futures and derivatives, may have on the water market. It may well be that these 
products and a focus by infrastructure operators on service delivery may improve the 
strength of the water market and reduce the need for security generally. However, these 
options are possible long-term solutions and the water market rules must have 
immediate application in order to address the objects contained in the Act. 
7.2 When security should be required of an irrigator 
7.2.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Several operators noted they were not in a position to assess the risk presented by 
individual irrigators holding a delivery entitlement in the absence of a water 
entitlement.265 Reasons cited include: 
 Any risk assessment needs to be ongoing and holding; tracking or managing 
security over exiting members’ delivery rights contributes to significant ongoing 
administrative costs.266  
 The risky nature of agricultural businesses.267  
 A lack of resources or expertise.268  
 Operators only become aware of an irrigator’s financial difficulties when payment 
of outstanding accounts becomes overdue.269  
 Operators are not always privy to the financial circumstances of new landholders 
and their ability to meet the access fees.270 
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default on the future payment of access fees in specific circumstances. 
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 The complexity of transactions is such that many market participants, including 
solicitors advising participants, remain uneducated about the new water trading 
regime.271  
Western Murray Irrigation suggested that difficulties in assessing risk were why a 
termination fee is charged on external transfers of water entitlements.272 Western 
Murray Irrigation did acknowledged that operators may have a credit payment history 
for water charges in cases where the irrigator is not a ‘new’ landholder.273 
In contrast, Murrumbidgee Irrigation submitted that: 
operators are well placed to assess credit risks, and Murrumbidgee Irrigation has accepted the 
current Schedule E Protocol in respect of seeking security over future payment of access 
fees.274  
Similarly, Murray Irrigation Limited noted its assessment of security requirements 
considers whether the landholder has been on stop-supply for a period of more than 
60 days within the preceding three years.275  
Several submissions argued that the motives of an irrigator maintaining delivery 
entitlements following trade of their water access entitlement are questionable. Given 
their concerns about irrigators’ motives and difficulties in identifying risk, security is 
automatically required to ‘replace the security of control of that [irrigation right] which 
the Scheme previously had.’276  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation preferred security to apply when the value of retained water 
falls below the value of the termination fee on delivery entitlement (rather than 
50 per cent as currently indicated in schedule E), but noted the risk differential was 
manageable.277 Similarly, the Murray-Darling Basin Commission noted that operator 
concerns about credit risk can be addressed if the principles contained within the 
schedule E are fully adopted by operators and parallel principles for intrastate trade are 
developed.278 The Murray-Darling Basin Commission also noted that security for future 
payment of fees should only be sought when absolutely necessary.279  
Macquarie River Food and Fibre suggested that irrigators should not be allowed to 
waive their obligation to pay a termination fee just because they have transformed or 
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transferred their share of a group water access entitlement into an individual 
entitlement.280  
In contrast, the Bondi Group and the West Corurgan Board of Management submitted 
that once water rights are transformed the only applicable fees will be government fees, 
(that are the responsibility of the individual), which implies no termination fee will be 
payable. They suggested that operators should only need to require security on the basis 
that the water will be used within the operator’s district.281  
7.2.2 Preliminary position 
There may be some difficulties for operators in assessing the credit risk of each 
irrigator within the scheme. This position was supported in the ACCC’s exit fees 
report:  
infrastructure operators have not developed appropriate credit risk management 
systems because in most cases they have had security of future payments because of 
restrictions on the trade of water entitlements.  
The schedule E protocol on access, exit and termination fees provides that 
infrastructure operators should only seek appropriate security for future payment of 
fees as a condition of the sale of water entitlements where: 
 the value of the seller’s remaining water entitlements (at the time of sale) is less 
than 50 per cent of the termination fee associated with any remaining delivery 
entitlements, and 
 the infrastructure operator has significant concerns with respect to the possibility of 
the seller defaulting on the payment of ongoing access fees.  
Some industry participants have incorrectly interpreted the 50 per cent threshold as 
allowing security for future payment of fees as a condition of transformation and/or 
trade where an irrigator trades more than 50 per cent of their water entitlement. 
There may be an administrative burden for operators in carrying out risk assessments 
and there is a case to modify the threshold test to provide more certainty for 
stakeholders.  
The sale of a water entitlement is only relevant to security considerations if the sale has 
a direct and consequential impact on the irrigator’s capacity to meet their ongoing 
access fee responsibilities.  
The ACCC acknowledges the concerns of some operators who suggest that once an 
irrigator has traded all of their water entitlement, the farm may have little value. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the irrigator’s operations will be unviable 
in all cases. As Western Murray Irrigation noted in its submission, an irrigator could 
trade all of their water entitlement and source all of their water from the temporary 
water market. In some circumstances, selling water entitlements may improve the 
                                                 
280  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 12. 
281  Bondi Group, submission 32, pp. 11–12; West Corurgan Board of Management, submission 50, p. 2. 
 59 
irrigator’s ability to pay ongoing access fees as can provide capital for the irrigator to 
move into other farming methods or crops. 
The threshold percentage limit of water held by an irrigator should balance the 
considerations of the operator’s need for security for future payment of fees, but also 
recognise that the water entitlement asset is the irrigator’s to use and/or trade.282  
In the absence of any further evidence or general information from operators to suggest 
an appropriate threshold, a judgment has been made about the circumstances in which 
an irrigator would represent a potential credit risk. The ACCC considers that irrigators 
should be permitted to trade up to 80 per cent of their original water entitlement before 
the operator considers whether there is a significant risk that the irrigator will be 
unable or unwilling to pay future access fees.  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation gave the example of a watered property where its water 
entitlement typically represents about 80 per cent to 95 per cent of total assets, with a 
capitalised liability for delivery entitlement in Murrumbidgee Irrigation of about 
15 per cent of water entitlement. 283 The ACCC  has understood this to imply that 
15 per cent of the value of an irrigator’s water entitlement should be sufficient to meet 
the potential future payment of a termination fee.  
The threshold whereby an operator can only require security for future payment of fees 
when the irrigator retains less than 20 per cent (or trades over 80 per cent) of their 
original water access entitlement appears broadly consistent with schedule E.  
The ACCC proposes the following two-part threshold test to determine when security 
for future payment of fees can be required of an irrigator as a condition of 
transformation and/or trade: 
The ACCC considered what constitutes ‘reasonable grounds’ and proposes further 
criteria defining the term reasonable grounds as Part 2 of the threshold test.  
                                                 
282  National Competition Council, Water reform under National Competition Policy: background 
papers - water property rights, February, 2001, p. 2. Available at www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/PIReWa-
007.pdf.  
283  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 5. 
PART 1 
An operator can only require security for future payment of fees when: 
 the irrigator will retain less than 20 per cent of their original water access entitlement; 
and 
 the infrastructure operator considers, on reasonable grounds, that there is a significant 
risk that the irrigator may be unable or unwilling to pay future access fees, when they 
fall due.  
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In the absence of specific default data in submissions, a judgment has been made as to 
the circumstances in which an irrigator would represent a potential credit risk. The 
ACCC invites stakeholders to provide further information to better inform this 
judgment. 
The reasonable grounds test described below includes an assessment of when an 
irrigator is in ‘arrears’.  
Murray Irrigation Limited noted that one indicator it uses to determine whether security 
is required is whether the landholder has been on stop-supply for a period of more than 
60 days within the preceding three years. 284 In the absence of any further information, 
the ACCC believes this is a reasonable ground upon which an operator may require 
security.  
In addition, new irrigators may represent a risk to operators because they do not have a 
credit history with the operator. The ACCC believes the water market rules should 
allow operators to address this risk. 
Once an irrigator transforms their water access entitlement, an operator may not have 
any recourse to restrict the trade of that entitlement and therefore require security when 
the threshold test is met. However, transformation itself does not necessarily represent 
a risk to an operator in the absence of trade in the water access entitlement.  
To address this concern, an operator should be permitted to register a charge over the 
irrigator’s water access entitlement at the time of transformation. The terms of the 
registered charge should restrict its application to 20 per cent of the irrigator’s water 
access entitlement.  
If an irrigator wishes to trade more than 80 per cent of its water access entitlement, the 
irrigator must seek the operator’s approval for the trade in accordance with the 
registered charge. An operator must give its consent to the trade unless the operator 
concludes, on reasonable grounds, that there is a significant risk that the irrigator may 
be unable or unwilling to pay future access fees when they fall due (under Part 2 of the 
threshold test). In these circumstances an operator may require security for the future 
payment of access fees in accordance with the water market rules concerning the form 
of, and limits on, security. 
                                                 
284  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 26. 
PART 2  
Reasonable grounds are considered to be where an irrigator: 
 has been in arrears in failing to pay the access charge for a period of more than 60 days 
on more than one occasion in the last three years, or 
 is a new landholder and has been a member of the scheme for fewer than three years. 
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To avoid any uncertainty, an operator may register a charge on the irrigator’s water 
access entitlement upon transformation to protect its right to require security in the 
future. However, an operator must not require security for the future payment of access 
fees upon transformation.  
7.3 The form security should take 
7.3.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Several operators submitted that in the case of default there may be no other assets of 
value available to recover the value of debt, which would limit the operator’s ability to 
enforce its contractual arrangements.285  
In terms of the success of ‘dry area’ properties, Western Murray Irrigation gave the 
example in its districts of an irrigator that sold all water entitlements but retained a 
permanent planting on the farm. The irrigator has had to source all of its water from the 
temporary water market at prices well in excess of $500 per megalitre (ML) in the past 
12 months. Wester Murray Irrigation noted that if the price remains high, its operations 
will be unviable and its ability to pay an access charge will be severely diminished.286  
Water 
Some operators suggested that water is the most suitable form of security as the 
operator has the ability to deny supply for non-payment of fees. In cases where all an 
irrigator’s water entitlement is transferred out, operators no longer have this 
protection.287  
                                                 
285  Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 3; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 5; 
Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 2; Narromine Irrigation Board of Management 
submission 33, p. 8. 
286  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 25. 
287  Mourquong co-operative, submission 14, p. 3; Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority, 
submission 15, p. 4. 
An operator may register a charge over 20 per cent of the irrigator’s water access 
entitlement upon transformation to protect its right to require security in the future.  
Under a registered charge, an operator must give its consent to the trade unless the operator 
concludes, on reasonable grounds, that there is a significant risk that the irrigator may be 
unable or unwilling to pay future access fees when they fall due. 
An operator must not require security for the future payment of access fees as a condition of 
the transformation of an irrigator’s irrigation right.  
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Bank guarantees 
Several submissions recommended bank guarantees, mortgages and deeds as 
alternatives to water as a form of security.288 Until 8 April 2008 Murray Irrigation 
Limited had a conditional requirement for landholders to lodge a security deposit in the 
form of a bank guarantee or cash deposit against future payment of access fees when 
water entitlements were permanently sold out.289  
Several submissions noted that bank guarantees incur upfront legal costs, so are 
relatively expensive to provide, both for the operator and the irrigator.290 Narromine 
Irrigation Board of Management submitted that: 
the charge or security may not, of itself, constitute a caveatable interest thereby limiting 
the use of caveats as a form of security.291  
Land 
The West Corurgan Board of Management suggested delivery entitlements should be 
attached to land because this would provide a way for an operator to secure revenue.292 
The Australian Bankers’ Association advised that infrastructure operators in New 
South Wales, South Australia and Victoria have the right to recover their fees and 
charges against land on the same terms as local government, which gives them priority 
over mortgagees. The Australian Bankers’ Association noted that while these 
provisions give absolute security over fees and charges, the timeframes for recovery 
may need to be reviewed, taking into account the cash-flow needs of a private 
business.293  
While several submissions noted the possibility of using land as security, most 
dismissed it on the following bases: 
 The remaining land may be worthless without an attached water access entitlement 
or irrigation right, particularly when it is in a state of abandonment.294  
 Un-mortgaged land is unlikely to exist on a landholding with credit risk. If a first 
mortgage already exists on the land with a bank, the infrastructure operator has little 
                                                 
288  Narromine Irrigation Board of Management, submission 33, p. 9; Murray Irrigation Limited, 
submission 40, pp. 12, 26; Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 5; Trangie Nevertire 
Irrigation Scheme, submission 56, p.2. 
289  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 26. 
290  Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 5, Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, 
p. 28. 
291  Narromine Irrigation Board of Management, submission 33, p. 9. 
292  West Corurgan Board of Management, submission 50, p. 2. 
293  Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, p. 4. See further the Local Government Act 1993 
(NSW), ss. 354, 355, 359, 718 and 720; the Irrigation Act 1994 (SA), ss. 62–64; the Water Act 1989 
(Vic), ss. 278–80. 
294  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 2. 
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hope of obtaining adequate security and ‘would be a very poor second in the 
collection of debts if the land owner is facing financial difficulty’.295  
 ‘In any practical sense, the relevant [irrigator’s] (un-mortgaged) land would have to 
be sub-divided and then sold to recover outstanding water accounts’.296  
As discussed above, Murray Irrigation Limited noted that its members would be 
unlikely to endorse more ‘aggressive’ debt recovery action, such as forced 
liquidation.297  
Insurance 
Another suggestion was that operators seek insurance against the risk of default. The 
National Farmers’ Federation suggested that an entity similar to the Export Finance 
Insurance Corporation should be established and administered by the MDB Authority 
to underwrite bad debts. The National Farmers’ Federation also suggested that the 
scheme could include agreed credit standards with operators.298 However, some 
operators submitted the costs associated with insuring against bad debt may be 
prohibitive.299  
7.3.2 Preliminary position 
Administrative and legal costs are associated with establishing security arrangements 
and these costs may vary according to the form of security. The costs of enforcing the 
security can also be significant. If security for future payment of fees is required under 
the threshold test, the irrigator is considered to represent a significant risk and should 
therefore bear the burden of the costs associated with establishing appropriate security.  
An irrigator should be entitled to the exclusive use of an entitlement and should be 
allowed to trade that entitlement for value. This right should be reflected in the water 
market rules by providing the irrigator with the ability to offer different forms of 
security. However, the value that can be realised from different forms of security may 
vary. For instance, if there are competing legal interests attached to an irrigator’s land, 
that land may not hold the same security as a cash deposit lodged as a bond. 
There are benefits for both operators and irrigators in using a bank guarantee or cash 
deposit as security. Under this arrangement, an irrigator would make a cash deposit to 
the operator and the operator would hold that deposit only as security until the contract 
is discharged. The operator cannot use the funds as any type of revenue. The 
administrative costs of a bond are minimal and the realisation value for the operator 
would be 100 per cent.  
                                                 
295  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 25. See also Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, 
p. 28. 
296  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 28. 
297  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 27. 
298  National Farmers’ Federation, submission 41, p. 8.  
299  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 3; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, submission 17, p. 4. 
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It may be most cost-effective for an irrigator to offer a water holding as security for 
future payment of fees because of the low administrative costs. A minimum holding of 
water access entitlement would have a realisation value for the operator of 100 per cent 
as long as no other legal interest was held over that entitlement. This form of security 
restricts an irrigator’s ability to trade the entitlement for value, but the irrigator would 
still be able to trade any allocations associated with those entitlements on a temporary 
basis. 
The ACCC proposes allowing irrigators to choose what form of security could be 
offered and requiring the operator to give due consideration to the offer.  
7.4 The value or quantum of security 
7.4.1 Submissions by stakeholders 
Different views were submitted on whether the amount of security should be limited. 
Several stakeholders suggested that the security should be consistent with the value of 
the remaining liability for delivery entitlement to the operator and therefore should be 
limited to the total termination fee liability.300 Another stakeholder suggested the 
termination fee liability should be a minimum value.301  
In contrast, a number of stakeholders recommended the amount of security should not 
be capped. These stakeholders reasoned that operators are not in a position to assess the 
extent to which a particular irrigator represented a credit risk, and the value of security 
would need to be sufficient to generate an annual return that could meet the ongoing 
access fee obligation. A limit on security may result in a shortfall in debt recovery, 
which would then need to be met by remaining irrigators.302 
                                                 
300  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 26; Murrumbidgee Irrigation submission 44, p. 5. 
301  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 26. 
302  Narromine Irrigation Board of Management, submission 33, p. 9; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, 
submission 17, p. 3; Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 3. 
If an operator seeks security for future payment of fees, the irrigator has the option to offer 
the operator security over: 
 an unencumbered portion of the irrigator’s water access entitlement, or 
 a bank guarantee, or 
 a cash deposit to be used as a form of bond. 
If the irrigator offers one of these forms of security, the operator must give due 
consideration to that offer.  
In any other case, the operator may accept any other form of security as negotiated between 
the operator and the irrigator. 
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7.4.2 Preliminary position 
The ACCC’s exit fees report noted:  
the quantum of any security collateral requested could at most be the termination fee that 
would be required upon the termination of any delivery entitlements kept by the 
irrigator.303  
Again, a balance should be struck between the needs of the operator in securing against 
the risk of default in future payment of fees and the irrigator’s exclusive water rights. 
Security in these circumstances should only be sufficient to meet a default in future 
payment of fees. Security should be considered a safety net so that if default occurs, the 
operator has immediate recourse to recover part of the debt owed. The operator remains 
free to enforce collection of the remainder of debt under normal business practices by, 
for instance, seeking legal remedies. Additionally, the legal and social/community 
disciplines on an irrigator paying the access fee are unchanged. 
The balance between operator and irrigator interests is best achieved by a proposed 
limit on security. Security should be limited to a level that contributes toward 
recovering the amount of the bad debt owed and, if delivery entitlements are terminated 
by the operator as a result of default, a proportion of the termination fee if applicable. 
The remainder of fees payable can be pursued using normal business practices.  
Operators should not be secured to the full value of the termination fee as this would 
represent an unreasonable burden on irrigators in exercising their individual water 
rights. Furthermore, in some limited circumstances, payment of termination fees is not 
required where delivery entitlements are not terminated as a result of default.  
The ACCC proposes a limit on the value of security up to 50 per cent of the termination 
fee.  
In some instances, a termination fee may not be applicable under the water charge 
rules. Under these circumstances, an operator can still face credit risks for delivery fees 
that have accrued in arrears. The ACCC proposes that the water market rules should 
permit security to cover one year’s access fees in cases where a termination fee is not 
applied by the operator. The appropriate limit on security should be the greater of these 
two values.  
The 50 per cent limit will help operators manage their credit risk while limiting the 
impact on an irrigator’s water rights. The limit is also consistent with the provisions of 
the schedule E threshold test discussed earlier in this chapter. Specifically, schedule E 
provides that an operator can not require security unless the current market value of any 
water entitlements held by an irrigator is less that 50 per cent of any termination fee 
payable on surrender of all delivery entitlements. 
                                                 
303  ACCC, A regime for the calculation and implementation of exit, access and termination fees 
charged by irrigation water delivery businesses in the southern Murray-Darling Basin, November 
2006, p. 54. 
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The value of security should be limited to the greater of: 
 50 per cent of the value of the termination fee as applied by the operator, in accordance 
with the cap on termination fees provided under the water charge rules, or 
 where an operator does not charge a fee on termination fee, the value of the annual 
delivery fee multiplied by 1. 
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8. Application and implementation of water 
market rules 
The Act provides for the water market rules to take into account transitional 
arrangements relating to contracts entered into between an operator and another person 
before water market rules are made or amended. In addition the Act provides for the 
ACCC to monitor compliance with the water market rules. Monitoring will necessarily 
involve information-gathering and reporting on the part of operators. 
8.1 Coverage 
8.1.1 Submission by stakeholders 
Numerous stakeholders, primarily smaller operators, submitted that the water market 
rules should differentiate in application between smaller and larger operators, 
predominantly because of the administrative costs associated with compliance 
activities.304 A lack of administrative capability to implement changes in order to 
operate under the water market rules was a common response to the issues paper.  
Several stakeholders considered a small operator should be defined according to the 
size of the irrigation network, the number of irrigators serviced or the volume of water 
rights held by the operator or their customers.305 Moira Private Irrigation District went 
further and suggested that smaller infrastructure operators should be defined as those 
with fewer than 50 000 ML of water entitlements or, alternatively, by reference to 
irrigation infrastructure owners whose assets have always been in private ownership.306 
Another suggestion was that the distinction should be made by reviewing the added 
cost of administrative compliance as a portion of an operator’s existing cost structure to 
determine the extent of the financial burden on specific classes of operators.307  
Some stakeholders submitted that exemptions should be given to other ‘classes’ of 
operators—for instance, off-river schemes that are generally small in size, are owned 
and operated by a group of small users and have relatively small volume of 
entitlement.308 In support of this, the Gol Gol Creek Growers Association submitted that 
private water diverters can operate and manage themselves cooperatively.309  
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Some stakeholders suggested another class exemption should be based on vulnerability 
to asset stranding and short-term opportunistic conduct by individual members or 
predatory conduct by larger organisations.310 
Many stakeholders suggested that the water market rules should have a tiered structure, 
with some fundamental rules applying to all and selected others only to larger 
operators.311  
Primarily, larger operators submitted that the water market rules should apply to all 
operators with no exceptions for a particular class of operator.312 Western Murray 
Irrigation noted that smaller operators would need significant assistance to implement 
water market rules because many would not even be aware that they are considered 
operators under the Water Act.313  
Several stakeholders noted that smaller operators have been excluded from the 
NWI and larger operators have been consistently discriminated against.314 Further, 
it was submitted that unless there is rigour in respect of compliance and deadlines, 
the current discrimination against members of larger operators will continue.315 
In support of this, the Australian Bankers’ Association submitted that the less 
variation among application of the market rules, the better.316  
Various suggestions were made by stakeholders about minimising the administrative 
burden of the water market rules. The Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia suggested 
that administrative costs for small operators could be minimised by standardising the 
transformation and trade procedures.317 Similarly, some stakeholders suggested the 
water market rules should be drafted with consideration given to compliance costs and 
that these should be sufficiently simple for any operator to implement, irrespective of 
scale.318  
Stakeholders also suggested ways in which this administrative burden could be 
recouped. Suggestions included that the costs could be recovered as part of the charges 
for processing water transformation and/or trade.319 However, others suggested that 
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government funds should be made available to smaller operators to enable them to meet 
increased compliance costs, which are large and unrecoverable, and that the funding 
should not be subject to cost-recovery provisions.320  
The New South Wales Irrigators’ Council contended that coverage of the water market 
rules should be extended to government water utilities because these utilities should be 
exposed to the discipline of competitive forces in their service delivery.321  
SunWater submitted that the water market rules will not apply in Queensland because 
all water entitlements were clearly vested with individual irrigators by the Water Act 
2000 (Qld).  
Central Irrigation Trust questioned whether the ACCC intends the water market rules to 
apply to corporate or managed investment schemes, and whether these schemes would 
be bound by the same trading and reporting obligations as Central Irrigation Trust.322  
8.1.2 Preliminary position 
Water market rules should apply to all operators within the MDB, subject to the 
provisions of the Act.  
There is little merit in limiting the scope of application of the water market rules 
beyond what is consistent with the Act. The objectives and principles of the Act would 
best be achieved with universal application of the water market rules. This would 
ensure certainty for all market participants about their rights and obligations and 
consistency in transformation and trading processes, which would thereby increase the 
efficiency associated with such processes. 
Operators may incur administrative costs as part of complying with the water market 
rules; however, these concerns can be addressed using ACCC assistance in the form of 
standard application forms and educational material. 
8.2 Transitional arrangements 
8.2.1 Submission by stakeholders 
Numerous stakeholders submitted that the water market rules should permit a transition 
to full compliance for small operators, including off-river schemes. Concerns related to 
                                                 
320  New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, p. 12.  
321  New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, p. 14. 
322  Central Irrigation Trust, submission 10, p. 4. 
The ACCC is of the view that the water market rules should apply to all operators within the 
MDB, subject to the provisions of the Water Act. 
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a lack of resources, for instance, because committee members of operators were often 
employed voluntarily.323. 
Some stakeholders submitted that there would be no merit in the delayed application of 
the rules for any class of operator, especially if assistance is provided to operators to 
comply with the rules.324  
Several stakeholders submitted that a reasonable transition period would be required to 
give all operators time to comply with the water market rules, to ensure compliance 
with and successful implementation of the rules.325 Western Murray Irrigation suggested 
that 12 months would be a reasonable period.326  
Several stakeholders submitted that the water market rules should have limited 
application to agreements already in place between operators and their irrigators.327 
The Bondi Group suggested that the water market rules should recognise pre-existing 
contracts—for example, when both parties to a contract agree that if it had been entered 
into in good faith, it should be allowed to run until it expires. The Bondi Group also 
suggested a minimum five-year period before contracts can be varied.328  
Western Murray Irrigation noted that current agreements do not have a scheduled end 
date329, although it noted that there is provision for these to be amended.330 However, 
there may be minimum timeframes in which these amendments can be completed. 
Murray Irrigation Limited gave an example of this—where the rules require changes to 
its company constitution, its company constitution specifies (consistent with the 
Corporations Act) minimum times in which to notify members of proposed changes.331  
A few stakeholders noted that irrigation rights are contractual in nature and operators 
should not be penalised for a change in law or policy.332 Western Murray Irrigation 
noted that in all instances operators must be given the opportunity to take appropriate 
action to honour infrastructure loans and land and water management plans entered into 
with the New South Wales Government under the terms of its bulk water licence.333  
                                                 
323  Mourquong Co-operative, submission 14, p. 6; Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 18; West Corurgan 
Board of Management, submission 50, p. 5; Gol Gol Creek Growers Association, submission 55, 
p. 1; Trangie Nevertire Irrigation Scheme, submission 56, p. 3; Sunraysia Citrus Growers, 
submission 17 p. 7; Narromine Irrigation Board of Management, submission 33, p. 14. 
324  Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, submission 26, p. 7; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 
44, p. 10; Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 11. 
325  Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 10; Western Murray Irrigation , submission 11, p. 5; 
Moira Private Irrigation District, submission 52, p. 2. 
326  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 42. 
327  New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, p. 12. 
328  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 18. 
329  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 42. 
330  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 16. 
331  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 43. 
332  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 42; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 10. 
333  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 9. 
 71 
Several stakeholders noted that the administrative costs associated with transition 
should be met by the government in the form of funding assistance for all operators334 
and that this should not be subject to cost-recovery provisions.335 
8.2.2 Preliminary position 
Several stakeholders submitted that to provide a level of certainty for participants, 
current contracts should be permitted to continue. These stakeholders also noted that 
when both parties to the contract agree to continue the contract, that should be 
sufficient to exempt the application of the water market rules. 
In some circumstances, contracts may have been negotiated between operators and 
irrigators in good faith and the written contracts reflect this. Even in situations where a 
formal written contract has been executed, these contracts may contain provisions 
inconsistent with the water market rules and the objectives and principles of the Act. 
The ACCC does not support the continued operation of contracts that contain such 
inconsistencies. Any current contract should continue to operate only to the extent that 
the contract is formally recognised by both parties in writing and is drafted in 
compliance with the water market rules. This will provide a significant degree of 
certainty for market participants and prevent operators from exploiting potential 
loopholes created if contracts are exempt from the water market rules on the basis that 
parties have agreed to ‘opt out’ of the rules application.  
All operators will need time in which to implement and give effect to the water market 
rules. The ACCC proposes transitional arrangements to give operators time to amend 
terms and conditions and make other necessary changes to comply with the water 
market rules. These timeframes should be sufficient for both large and small operators. 
The water market rules are being drafted with significant consideration being given to 
the issue of compliance burden and should not be unduly onerous on any particular 
operator to implement. 
The ACCC proposes that the first stage of implementation would consist of a 
transitionary period that would run from the tabling of the rules to September 2009 (for 
commencement in the next irrigation season).  
During stage 1, operators must use their best endeavours to ensure that they do not 
prevent or unreasonably delay transformation and/or trade. The transition period will 
allow operators time to make necessary amendments to documents such as their 
constitution, contracts or application forms. Operators should give priority to 
addressing compliance with the water market rules where current actions or inactions 
of operators are directly preventing or hindering transformation and trade. In particular, 
prohibited restrictions within operators’ governing documentation and supply contracts 
should be promptly addressed. 
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From September 2009, the water market rules should apply in full. Monitoring will be 
required to assess their effectiveness and to assist in identifying instances of potential 
breaches.  
8.3 Monitoring and reporting requirements 
8.3.1 Submission by stakeholders 
Some stakeholders expressed support for ACCC involvement in the water market and 
suggested that operators should report to, and be monitored by, the ACCC to ensure 
prohibition of unreasonable or unfair constraint on trade.336  
Some stakeholders submitted that currently there is no or very little formal monitoring 
of water market transactions, particularly of small operators.337 Conversely, other 
stakeholders suggested operators’ conduct is substantially monitored under compliance 
reporting required under federal and state government legislation and policy.338 
Some smaller operators contended that the cost of complying with any monitoring 
requirements will be ‘horrific’ and that they should not be expected to maintain the 
same rigorous monitoring scheme that the larger operators may adhere to.339  
Western Murray Irrigation submitted that the ACCC should consider the 
following when developing a monitoring regime and associated information 
requirements:  
 resource limitations of the operators (skills, time and money)  
 distance and isolation of many operators from experienced legal advisers and so on 
 the retention of directors and chief executive officers if monitoring is excessive and 
if there is a risk of penalties being imposed at an individual level  
                                                 
336  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 11; South Australian Farmers’ Federation, 
submission 42, p. 5. 
337  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 42; Australian Bankers’ Association, submission 25, 
p. 13; Waterexchange, submission 46, p. 11. 
338  Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 19; Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 43; Macquarie 
River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 16. 
339  Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 4; Bondi Group, submission 32, p. 19.  
The ACCC proposes the following timetable for transition to water market rules: 
 Stage 1—from the date the rules are tabled to September 2009—implementation period 
for operators to amend contracts and other documents. During stage 1, operators must 
use their best endeavours to ensure that they do not prevent or unreasonably delay 
transformation and/or trade. 
 Stage 2—from September 2009—full enforceability of the water market rules and 
monitoring. 
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 private ownership versus public ownership—the performance reporting regime for 
publicly owned authorities are different to that applying to privately owned 
operators 
 the frequency of and cost of monitoring to all involved 
 a process to respond to individual irrigator’s complaints  
 warnings and appeals processes.340  
Other stakeholders noted that the ACCC should provide guidance on information 
required by indicating the types of monitoring it expects to implement and ensuring that 
compliance costs are kept low.341 Additionally, Murray Irrigation Limited noted that the 
ACCC should avoid duplicating existing monitoring and reporting arrangements, such 
as those overseen by the National Water Commission.342  
A few stakeholders suggested the ACCC’s compliance monitoring should be limited to 
assessment of complaints, given that the activities of most operators are already 
monitored by others, including its members and other stakeholders.343  
On the objectives of monitoring, the Minerals Council of Australia submitted that 
performance indicators should be used and the results documented in annual reports.344 
Further, the South Australian Farmers’ Federation submitted that the framework for 
monitoring should be comprehensive, open and transparent, and that it is crucial that 
the Commission is given real authority to enforce compliance and impose penalties.345 
Macquarie River Food and Fibre went further by suggesting that there needs to be 
monitoring and ability for enforcement of standards across government departments, to 
ensure that the trading process is not hindered.346  
A few stakeholders submitted that the monitoring and reporting regime should include 
an ongoing assessment of the social and economic impacts of trade if it is concentrated 
out of a specific region.347  
8.3.2 Preliminary position 
The ACCC proposes to keep reporting requirements to a minimum. However, it does 
not propose to exempt classes of operators from monitoring requirements. The results 
of monitoring will form an important base from which to assess the success and 
appropriateness of the water market rules. An incomplete monitoring result may occur 
if specific classes of operators are excluded from monitoring requirements. This could 
                                                 
340  Western Murray Irrigation, submission 11, p. 43. 
341  Murrumbidgee Private Irrigators, submission 3, p. 4; SunWater, submission 21, p. 2; Bondi Group, 
submission 32, p. 19. 
342  Murray Irrigation Limited, submission 40, p. 43. 
343  SunWater, submission 21, p. 2; Murrumbidgee Irrigation, submission 44, p. 10; Macquarie River 
Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 16. 
344  Minerals Council of Australia, submission 39, p. 8. 
345  South Australian Farmers’ Federation, submission 42, p. 5. 
346  Macquarie River Food and Fibre, submission 53, p. 16. 
347  New South Wales Irrigators’ Council, submission 31, pp. 2, 12–13; Queensland Farmers’ Federation 
and Queensland Irrigators’ Council, submission 58, p. 8. 
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arise particularly if a specific market rule were to affect certain classes of operators 
differently to others. 
In developing the water market rules the ACCC is considering the burden that future 
monitoring requirements and their administration may place on operators. The ACCC 
is also investigating how to eliminate any doubling-up of reporting requirements for 
operators. However, the ACCC requires more details about the specific information 
captured by other agencies and/or market participants during their current monitoring 
activities. 
Beyond these considerations, the ACCC will not be in a position to propose any 
specific reporting requirements until the water market rules are more fully developed. 
 
The ACCC proposes to keep reporting requirements to a minimum for the purposes of 
monitoring.  
The ACCC is developing the water market rules while having regard to the potential 
monitoring requirements and associated administrative burden on operators. 
